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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the development and overall thrust of Hannah
Arendt's social and political theory was significantly informed by her
comprehension of and reactions to movement. I attempt to show that
particular forms of movement were prized by Arendt and used as
justification for her criticism and advocacy of certain ways of directing our
lives. With the exception of the first chapter's analysis of The Human
Condition-one of her later works which sets out most explicitly her analysis
and appraisal of movement--the thesis proceeds chronologically from
Arendt's PhD thesis. Love and Saint Augustine. through to The Life of the
Mind, a work which was uncompleted at the time of her death. Thematically.
the thesis addresses Arendt's political works, looking at her ideal of political
action and the trends of the modem age that pose a threat to it. and her
theoretical and philosophical works, exploring Arendt's later interest in the
relationship between thought and action and the relationship between
activities of the mind and activities of the world.
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... if it is the insertion of man that breaks up the indifferent
flow of everlasting change by giving it an aim, namely,
himself, the being who fights it, and if through that insertion
the indifferent time stream is articulated into what is behind
him, the past, what is ahead of him, the future, and himself,
the fighting present, then it follows that man's presence
causes the stream of time to deflect from whatever its original
direction or (assuming a cyclical movement) ultimate non-
direction may have been. The deflection seems inevitable
because it is not just a passive object that is inserted into the
stream, to be tossed about by its waves that go sweeping over
his head, but a fighter who defends his own presence and
thus defines what otherwise might be indifferent to him as
"his" antagonists: the past, which he can fight with the help
of the future; the future, which he fights supported by the past.
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind
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lNTRODUcnON
Arendt and Sociology, Sociology and Arendt
At first glance. Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) is an improbable subject of
an MA thesis in sociology. Not only was Arendt a vocal critic of the major'
manifestations of sociology that prevailed during her life time-Weberianism.
neo-evolutionism, structural functionalism alike-she also spent much of her
professional life seeking to show that sociology's object. the "social" realm,
was deeply suspect. According to Arendt the emergence of the "social" in the
nineteenth century, and its entrenchment in the twentieth. had increasingly
displaced the "public" realm of authentic political life. "Social" relations in
the modem world were those of the mass man, the individual who saw
himself. and correspondingly behaved. as part of an aggregate. In contrast to
the actor within the "public" space beloved and theorised by "republicans"
since Machiavelli's dayl, an actor who seeks to initiate novel projects within
the constraints laid down by his peers, the mass individual is a conformist: a
prisoner of either bourgeois convention or of the terror of totalitarian states
that demand discipline rather than freedom, and inculcate ideology rather
than cultivate the "dialogue of the mind." Moreover, sociology, as a
"science, H has actually contributed to the existence of this social realm by the
very theories (of law-like determination) and methods (the ideal-type) which
it has employed to make sense of human beings under modem conditions.
For sociology, what is Hinteresting" is what is typical, what can be revealed as
patterned behaviour by survey methods, and statistical analysis, which imply
not human plurality but standardization. For Marxism as a theory of praxis
she had a more healthy respect. but Marxism too had only helped to deepen
the contemporary malaise and eviscerate the ideal of citizenship. For Marx,.
man's prime faculty was labour, not the capacity for political action; indeed
the goal of Marxism was the obliteration of the political ("public") realm,
since it was conceived as an arena of class oppression.
However, there are important reasons for considering Arendt from the
perspective of sociology. She has much to teach us about a number of issues
vital to modernity: the decline of the public sphere and subsequent
development of a "social" realm.. totalitarianism, the fragility of the human
artifact,. the nature of social evil, and-the issue that will concern me most
directly in this thesis-"movement. H Arendt both adopts a metaphorical style
and analyzes the metaphors embedded in depictions of the modem age. In
addition, her metaphors predominantly refer to types of movement. What is
more important. Arendt grounds her diagnoses of the human condition and
the modem age in her perception and valuation of various kinds of
movement. In this thesis. I will be suggesting that movement provides the
fundamental organizing structure of Arendt's narrative of modernity, and
furnishes the key legitimating principle of her political project.
The thesis proceeds along the following lines. Chapter 1 deals primarily
with Arendt's The Human Condition, presenting the rudimentary capacities
and limits of human beings living on an "earth" and in a "world." Arendt's
metaphorical style will be examined, looking at the metaphors of movement
within the natural and human world, the movements of labour, work. and
action. Although such a procedure departs from strict chronology--The
Human Condition, first published in 1958, was one of her later books-it has
an exegetical logic: of all her works, The Human Condition is most explicit in
its analysis and appraisal of movement. It thus sensitizes the interpreter to
the antecedents and developments of the concept that most concerns me
here. Chapter 2 examines the significance of Christianity for Arendt's
perception of movement. During antiquity, Arendt argued, the regular,
circular movement of the heavens were imposed upon the chaotic
movements of nature and the social and political world. Christianity
represented a rupture with this conception. The birth of Christ, because it
claimed to represent a wholly "novel" occurrence in the world, denoted the
movement of rectilinearity-as opposed to the circular motion of nature or
the movement of unilinearity that precludes the novel ty of unpredictable
beginnings-and suggested for the first time the idea of a divine rectilinear
history for the whole of humankind. However, the new beginnings enacted
by Christians were individual, private, inner-worldly beginnings, thereby
leaving the secular, public world turning endlessly in cyclical motion. This
cycle was itseU finally broken in the modem age, but linearity arose, according
to Arendt, in both constructive rectilinear and destructive unilinear forms.
Chapter 3 concentrates primarily on the destructive unilinear movement of
"process" represented. by the political form of totalitarianism and the idea of
historical inevitability. The distinction between movement and stability is
also drawn out more fully together with its relationship to citizenship and
politics. Chapter 4 puts forward Arendt's alternative to "process," political
action, best characterized by the American and French Revolutions.
Revolution, marking the first authentic and "new" manmade beginning-and
breaking with the original meaning of the term-now assumed. the form of a
constructive rectilinear metaphor for the secular world and simultaneously
emphasized the political act of foundation or beginning. Foundation and
rectilinearity are linked, moreover, to the durability of the body politic: the
novel, undetermined movement of political action refers back to the act of
foundation and reaches forward rectilinearly into the future to maintain the
continual, stable, and sempitemal existence of the res publica. In chapter 5, I
switch from Arendt's political theory to the philosophical speculations she
developed in her last major work The Life of the Mind. My analysis is
prefaced by an account of Arendt's interpretation of the Eichmann trial, for it
was this trial--and the "thoughtlessness" it exposed-which prompted her
reflections on the relationship between thought and action, and thought and
evil. Finally, I will offer a conclusion that summarizes and draws together the
narrative of movement that pervades and underpins Arendt's work.
CHAPTER 1
Movement and the Vita Activa
1.1 Arendt and Metaphor
As her aitics have frequently pointed out, Arendt relies on metaphors
in telling her story of the modem Fall of Man. The uncontrollable process of
an atomic chain-reaction, 'natural' in a sense, but also 'unnatural', since it
would never have occurred without human action.. lurks metaphorically
behind those other quasi-natural and unstoppable processes in terms of
which she portrays totalitarian terror, economic development (the 'life
process of mankind'), and the degeneration of revolutions. It would be a
mistake to suppose, however, that what she is doing is merely arbitrary, and
that she is imposing the metaphor of 'process' on the real world. Her method
is rather to meditate upon and bring into the light of consciousness a
metaphor that is deeply embedded in modem thinking and that strongly
influences the way we experience the world. Like a literary critic drawing
attention to the images implicit in a poem, she reflects upon modern modes
of experience and the images in which they are cast.
Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation
of HeT Political Thought.
The Human Condition, often considered the culmination of Hannah
Arendt's political thought,! offers a strikingly original way of understanding
social and political theory and the social and political world it seeks to
disclose. Assuredly, a metaphorical style of reading political and economic
forms of organization and their theoretical counterparts is hardly new in
itself. What makes Arendt's writing novel is her manner of drawing upon
metaphors largely in tenns of movement and motion. Moreover, as Canavan
shows, Arendt elicits her metaphors from the language of both the acting
public and the theorists of capitalist society. Arendt does not choose these
metaphors "arbitrarily," but uses them intentionally to illuminate the images
that are "deeply embedded in modern thinking and... strongly [influence] the
way we experience the world."2 By contrast, Arendt believed that Marx was
not speaking metaphorically, but literally, when he spoke of the "life process
of society."J However, while Canavan identifies the intentional use of
metaphor in Arendt, she does not recognize its selective adoption. Canavan
notes the metaphor of "process" dominating Arendt's explanation of the
modem age, relating to two fundamental human experiences: our physical,
factual subjection to nature and our ability to act, to begin things anew,
unleashing the unpredictable into an equally unpredictable world. But this
uncritical explanation of Arendt's metaphorical style does not delve into the
under!ying significance of metaphors of movement.
Interestingly, Arendt herself only explicitly acknowledges these
metaphors for what they are in the conduding chapter, "Ideology and
Terror,"", of The Origins of Totalitarianism, her political manifesto 0 n
Revolution, and The Life of the Mind. In these cases, and implicitly
throughout her other works, she, first, notes the movements that have
influenced and infonned modern developments (for instance, the "labour
movement") and, secondly, claims that movement in itself has been idealised
and actually embodied in these modern developments. For example, in
"Ideology and Terror" she argues "When the Nazis talked about the law of
nature or when the Bolsheviks talk about the law of history, neither nature
nor history is any longer the stabilizing source of authority for the actions of
mortal men; they ace movements in themselves:'5 Not only, then, have
particular metaphors of movement been adopted, but the actualization of
these modem developments has become, according to Arendt, movement
itself. Before examining this in more detail, however, let us look at how
Arendt constructs the vita activo, the triad that composes the activities of
human existence.
1.2 Movement and the Human Condition
Social and political theory has historically performed two general
functions. It has operated on an analytical level. explaining and characterizing
the actions of people and their relation to a systemic whole. Secondly, it has
been prescriptive, endorsing certain manners of acting and certain social and
political orders while denigrating others. By informing us of our current
circumstances and suggesting alternative or ideal forms of action, such
theories seek to provide us with the means of taking control of the course of
our lives. The very ability intentionally to alter and direct action relies upon a
prior notion of the self-conscious and reflective character of humans, a
quality that has been said to distinguish us from animals and nature. So that
with the realization that humans are more than mere animals, that we can be
free-thinking, self-determined beings, comes particular ways of looking at the
way we, as opposed to non-human creatures and things, may direct and
define our existence.
What it means to be human, then,-beyond any isolated notions of
freedom, action, order-can itself become an ideal. Most social and political
theories concentrate upon the clarification of ideals and some have sought
methods for their realization. As such, social and political theory can be
viewed as attempts to reckon with the movements of nature by imposing
"human" rhythms and patterns of movement against beside, or in time with
the flux of the world. Another fundamental distinction found in social and
political thought is that between stability and change. This differentiation lies
at the base of all political organization. setting the stability of the polity against
the fleeting character of human action. Arendt claims that, to counteract the
instability of human action,. "bodies politic have always been designed for
permanence and their laws understood as limitations imposed upon
movement."6 In a world where human actions are ever-changing and
unpredictable, politics aims at the stabilization of human movement by
imposing laws and regulations. Political bodies are also "designed for
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permanence": by limiting the possibilities of human action through positive
laws-by preventing individuals from encroaching upon each other and from
posing a threat to the state--political bodies maintain their existence and
thereby prove their durability, their relative sense of pennanence. Positive
laws, as Arendt explains in The Origins of Totalitarianism, back up the
permanence of the polity because they stand outside individual actions,
straddle particular generations and can sometimes even extend beyond the
borders of specific states. Bodies politic, acting as the guarantor of positive law,
provide the stability necessary to regulate the unpredictable actions of men.
(Likewise, both Machiavelli's Prince and Discourses for example, concern
themselves with the same issues of the maintenance and durability of
government.)
The sphere of politics, then, is meant to provide a durable world, a
world which Arendt directly opposes to the evanescent character of nature
and the life process. "Life is a process that everywhere uses up durability,
wears it down, makes it disappear, until eventually dead matter, the result of
small, single, cyclical, life processes, returns into the over-all gigantic circle of
nature herself, where no beginning and no end exist and where all natural
things swing in changeless, deathless repetition."7 All natural things are
exchangeable because they are, in the end, a matter of consumption and the
continuation of the life process.
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Arendt claims that human beings are neither radically autonomous
nor completely without the possibility of self·detennined mobility. While
there are definite conditions which confront humans. people also possess the
potential for freedom. choice, and action. The vita activa--the three
fundamental activities of labour, work,. and action given to humanity on
earths-constitutes the capabilities humans have for shaping the earth and
modifying their circumstances. Arendt outlines "life itself, natality and
mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth"9 as conditions humans
encounter. Anything which engages with human beings becomes a condition
of existence: the physical body and its abilities, earthly matter, products of
work,. and worldly beliefs and ideas. Humans are conditioned both by their
bodies and by the world's creations and works fashioned by previous
generations. This is the human condition, and Arendt distinguishes it from
the concept of a human nature. To speak of a human nature implies an
exhaustive understanding or indubitable knowledge of human beings and
their quintessential characteristics. However, such knowledge is impossible
precisely because human beings do not create themselves: only a God, she
argues, could possibly know the nature of our being.10 The human condition
refers to the setting or circumstances within which humans labour, work. and
act rather than defining any essential human trait.
The plausibility of a human nature diminishes further when it is
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understood that human beings are, more than anything else, plural beings.
This condition of plurality sets humans apart from animals and only
manifests itself within a "political" context, that is. within the public sphere.
Arendt argues that "men, not Man. live on the earth and inhabit the
world." 11 In other words, people are not homogenous, unchanging creatures
that intrinsically harbour a single trait or set of traits, uniform nature, or
general wilL People are, rather, diverse, creative, inquisitive, and they initiate
action. Human plurality only manifests itself in the public sphere where
human beings on equal grounds listen to and acknowledge the viewpoints of
others. Only by acting in the public sphere does human plurality become
evident, and only because we are plural beings are we capable of action.
While the public sphere provides the necessary space for action and for
human plurality, the private sphere prOVides the space for satisfying the
biological requirements that tie us to the earth. Part of the human condition,
Arendt argues, is our physical, biological relation to the earth: we are
fundamentally human beings that must continually nourish and provide for
our material bodies. The burden of this life process is carried by the private
sphere of the household or family and is characterized by the persistent battle
with the necessities of our organic condition. By restricting women from the
public sphere and procuring slaves, the private sphere of the Greek
household managed to free the men of these households from personally
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labouring for their necessities of life. As (ong as we remain upon the earth,
bodily needs arise requiring us to labour repetitively. While labour is
cyclically repetitive, it extends our lives in a rectilinear fashion from birth
until death. In the end, the life process is something that all people must
inevitably deal with in one way or another-how it is dealt with depends
upon social and political organization. If one is unable to move beyond the
compulsive nature of the life process, if one is unable to emerge from the
private into the public realm, then.. according to Arendt, one will never have
the possibility to develop or express a unique identity. People that remain
bound to their organic requirements are, like any other animal species.
deprived of the potential space and freedom for plural interaction.
By arguing that people "live on the earth" and "inhabit the world,"
Arendt distinguishes between earth and world in terms of the functions of
the vita activa. The earth refers to the raw, physical material of our planet
that human beings consume for the perpetuation of life. Members of hom 0
sapiens are tied to this natural earth and are required to labour continually for
mere physical existence. Labour, then, is the initial activity of the vita activa
and is exercised in our battle for human survival. Labour is repetitive because
it is tied to never-ending needs and was traditionally performed. Arendt
claims, not for its own sake but. rather, for the sake of providing another set
of conditions for involvement in the public sphere. The products of labour
14
are not durable and must be continually, cyclically produced. They are created
to be consumed-and consumed with the urgent necessity of the life-process.
The earth, then, is the general condition of all organic life and can be equated
with nature.
Arendt models her understanding of nature and the human's
biological relationship with nature upon the Greek understanding of the
cosmos: the universe is eternal, nature is cyclical with ever-recurring life, and
the gods are immortal. In the Greek view, human beings are marked as
biological creatures that suffer a mortal existence inherent in each
individual's rectilinear progression from birth until death. Therefore
mortality became the emblematic constituent of human life, setting it apart
from god-like existence. [n order to continue the rectilinear pattern of the life
process. in order to maintain one's existence over a stretch of time,
individuals must continually produce and consume things, such as food and
clothing.. in accordance with material necessity. But in order to extend their
influence beyond the limits of physical existence in the world, beyond birth
and death, people must create objects and partake in events which serve to
outlast their finite time on earth. Mortal humans, according to the Greek
model, find themselves living upon an "earth" on which they must construct
a "world." The Greeks, hoping to emulate the gods, strove for immortality by
seeking to leave behind works, deeds, and words which might attain
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immortal existence in the world of things. Through stories and objects.
individuals can potentially exist across generations and throughout time,
thereby approaching the immortality of the gods. By creating such works.
humans demonstrate their ascendence over animals, which are unable to
develop the indiViduality needed to rise above the uniformity of their
species.
The world, therefore, consists of the things we produce out of our flight
from or overcoming of the necessities of our biological ties to the earth. By
freeing itself from the earth's requirements, the world allows a common
space within which human beings construct conditions which are artificial,
not natural. Products of the vita activa, the products of work, have
independent standing and the ability to endure beyond the life of the creator.
Whereas labour, through the consumption of its product, returns its matter
to the earth, work removes material from the earth. Examples of enduring
works are architecture, the tools with which we labour, ideas as written in
books, and works of art. Ideas or concepts cannot be considered works unless
they have been written down or transformed into some objective shape. Such
endurance, in tum, requires an objectifiable medium. The products of work
transcend individual lives and condition the lives of the newborn, providing
some sense of continuity between generations and providing the material
with which we construct our history. Work is not repetitive and cyclical like
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labour but provides durable objects within which we may map a rectilinear
story of human existence. The world, then, is a space for differentiation and
durability.
Whereas the private sphere constitutes the realm in which humans
confront biological necessity-where humans toil continuously to satisfy the
requirements of the life process-the public sphere provides the space for
plurality and the opportunity to disclose identity and reality. The Greek polis,
Arendt's archetypal model of the public sphere, was possible because a certain
number of men violently enslaved others to take care of their necessities.
Freedom could only be attained in the public sphere of the polis at the cost of
enslaving the labour power of others: without the freedom from bodily,
earthly needs people cannot act or achieve plurality; political life, the bios
politikos, was only realizable once one had overcome the necessity of the
household by such acts of violence. The political life of the polis was the
realm of freedom-politics for the Greeks was freedom--and this allowed men
a space within which they could act and speak freely. openly, in the
illumination of plurality. The polis was a spatial rupture in the human
condition of necessity. Further. freedom entailed equality; "to be free meant to
be free from the inequality present in rulership and to move in a sphere
where neither rule nor being ruled existed."12 To free oneself from the rule of
necessity required courage because one could no longer submerge oneself in
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one's own life, survival, and personal anonymity. Instead, one had to bear the
burden of participation-and the risk of failure--in a plural arena.
The public realm, thus, provides the condition for worldly things,
deeds, and acts to occur, for durability, where people prove their lives to be
separate from necessity and unexchangeably human. In it individuals in
plural discourse articulate their own identities and reveal a common reality.
Arendt took up this Greek distinction because she believed that the private
and public spheres were separate and ought to remain that way, that they
were distinctive realms with different purposes. But the advent of the
modem age, she argued, has blurred the distinction between the public and
the private and has given rise to a new phenomenon she calls the "sociaL"
The appearance of the "social," a separate and distinct sphere, denotes the
alienation of the world, loss of meaning, erosion of the public sphere, and the
reduction of politics to administration. While the ancient world knew only
two realms, the private and public, in regard to which they drew fundamental
distinctions, the dawn of the modem age altered this relationship radically.
Initially, the nation-state resembled a large parental body within an even
larger private sphere: the state's administration became a bureaucratic body
which saw its role as "housekeeper." The new political realm lost the values
of freedom and action, and became a routinized and methodically regulated
machine reducing the public to a body of family members. The modem age
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drove a wedge between freedom and the political so that society's
understanding of politics has become "compatible with freedom only because
and insofar as it guarantees a possible freedom from politics."l3
Like the private sphere. the social sphere is characterized by labour and
biological necessity and requires, or assumes, that its people behave as a
homogenous, unified assembly. "To have a society of laborers, it is of course
not necessary that every member actually be a laborer or worker... but only
that all members consider whatever they do primarily as a way to sustain
their own lives and those of their families."H Politics in the modem world is
the politics of "the people" so that idiosyncracy, difference, and plurality
become understood as detrimental to political action or political stability.
Arendt argues,
Hence, the general will is the articulation of a general interest, the
interest of the people or the nation as a whole, and because this interest
or will is general. its very existence hinges on its being opposed to each
interest or will in particular... the oneness of the nation is guaranteed
in so far as each citizen carries within himself the common enemy as
well as the general interest which the common enemy brings into
existence; Jor the common enemy is the particular interest or the
particular will of each man.! 5
The social, then, not only homogenizes people. but denies people their
individual political identity. For the Greeks. to be human meant to reveal
your individuality in a public space where each person acknowledges the
pLurality of others but also constructs a reality through difference. The rise of
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the social in the modem age doses down the space in which political identity
is revealed and alienates people from themselves by reducing them to the
common process of biological necessity, labour, or historical inevitability.
To sum up: humans are conditioned by the setting within which they
find themselves; yet, they actively modify the circumstances within which
they have been born. This active manipulation of conditions Arendt calls the
vita activa and is constituted by the three fundamental modes of human
activity: labour, work. and action. Thus far, I have dealt with the first two.
Labour, the repetitive toil people engage in for their subsistence, is properly
located within the private sphere but, with the advent of modernity, has
come to characterize the trans-private world of "society." The things we have
physically created, that have the ability to endure through time, differentiate
human beings from other animals, and that set up our world, are the
products of work. For Arendt, the transformation towards a labouring society
in the age of modernity has done more than erode the public sphere and
transform politics into an administrative body; it has also diminished the
private realm by depriving people of "home." Privacy is important as a refuge
when retreating from the public realm. However, neither labour nor the
private realm is good or worthwhile in itself. For Arendt, the key
characteristic of human beings is their plurality. The private sphere and
labour are insufficient because they are isolating and solitary: they do not
20
allow people to act upon their plurality. Plurality can only become manifest
in a political setting which is free.
In terms of movement, natural movement--circular, repetitive
movement-would be the only movement of human life if it were not for the
construction of a human artifice. Only because of this human world, Arendt
argues, can the birth and death of individuals have any meaning whatsoever.
By acting, individuals set themselves apart from each other, proving their
uniqueness, and creating the conditions whereby birth and death hold
significance. Equally, it is only because of the human artifice that nature can
be understood as the process of growth and decay: "only if we consider
nature's products, this tree or this dog, as individual things, thereby already
moving them from their 'natural' surroundings and putting them into our
world, do they begin to grow and decay."16 By distinguishing birth and death
from the "changeless, deathless repetition" of nature, the never-ending,
circular movement of nature is dislodged and can be viewed or rewritten as a
single rectilinear movement--the movement from birth until death.17 Life is
now understood as foUowing a "strictly linear movement whose very motion
nevertheless is driven by the motor of biological life which man shares with
other living things and which forever retains the cyclical movement of
nature."18
The life process, discriminated in these two ways, is represented as two
21
differing forms of movement. The life process in itself, nature outside of the
context of a human world, is a cyclical, repetitive movement that goes
nowhere and has no beginning or end. The process has no purpose other
than its own self·perpetuation, other than maintaining its own movement,
and can, as such, be seen as effectively having no purpose (purposes are
constructs of the human world). The idea of a fixed, purposeless, eternally
rotating, circular movement is Arendt's basic, fundamental understanding of
her term process. (When Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, in their
characterization of the culture industry, state "The machine rotates on the
same spot,"19 they allude to the same movement invoked by Arendt to
illustrate her basic idea of process.)
This fundamental idea of process undergoes alteration when
understood from the vantage point of the human artifice. By taking on a
rectilinear character from the beginning, which is birth, to the end, which is
death, the circular process of biological provision feeds human purposes and
activities, feeds the active cultivation of an individual's life story. The life
process of human,. worldly life-Arendt's second meaning for the movement
of the life process-moves in a repetitive, cyclical fashion but. at the same
time, moves forward in a rectilinear manner like the movement of a cyclist,
where repetitive pedalling returns to the original starting point of each
revolution but moves the cyclist forward. The life process of human beings,
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as opposed to the monotonous, meaningless, rotation of nature, has a
purpose.
Labour is the single activity which provides for hu::.lan necessity, for
the life pmcess of individuals, and is characterized, like the life process of
nature, as repetitive and cyclical. The products of labour have no worldly
permanence but are consumed almost as soon as they have been produced.
mdividuallives, which are the only real "products" of labour,20 are the sole
things that take on the appearance of rectilinearity and appear this way only
in the light of a shared, public world. If humans were only labourers, if our
lives were wholly caught up with the movement of the life process, our lives
would play out according to the "law of mortality, which is the most certain
and the only reliable law of a life spent between birth and death."21 This is so,
because the movement of labour in itself, when divorced from its relation to
the remainder of the vita activa, is a necessary movement that "is born of a
great urgency and motivated by a more powerful drive than anything else,
because life itself depends on it."22 Arendt's use of "law" in this sense, in
opposition to positive laws, relates purely to movement. The "law of
mortality" is a necessary motion which moves in a predetermined and
inescapable direction. Ultimately, Arendt's explanation of the process
movement of life or nature is of this undeviating, inexorable law of
movement,. moving in a predefined, circular way.
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Arendt, we have seen, regards the defining feature of the modem age
as the infiltration of labour into the public sphere. where private labour takes
on a social character. When labour enters the public sphere, the individual
character of lahour--labour performed for a single person's needs and
survival-transfonns itself into the labour for humankind: "only when man
no longer acts as an individual. concerned only with his survival, but as a
'member of the species,' .. can the collective life process of a 'socialized
mankind' follow its own 'necessity: "23 This public ascension of labour
generates a corresponding alteration in movement: "The admission of labour
to public stature, far from eliminating its character as a process... has, on the
contrary, liberated this process from its cirrolar, monotonous recurrence and
transformed it into a swiftly progressing development whose results have in
a few centuries totally changed the whole inhabited world.uN For the
individual, the process movement of labour is repetitive and circular, but
yields the rectilinear movement of human life from birth until death. The
process movement of public labour, while still based upon the circularity of
labour, alters the linear portion of the motion: the process movement of
private labour is a conservative stabilizing movement "where the human
body... concentrates upon nothing but its own being alive,"25 but the
movement of the labour process when it enters the public realm transforms
itself into a "swiftly progressing development." Whereas the process
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movement of Labour in the private sphere produces and perpetuates public
lives that move in a rectilinear fashion between fixed parameters-between
the births and deaths of individuals and between the beginnings and ends of
actions sequences-the process movement of labour in the public sphere
moves in a ltnilinear manner progressively forward, in a single straight line,
into infinity without end. The difference between rectilinear and unilinear
movement is a subtle but vital one for Arendt's philosophical position. They
are both movements that occur in straight lines. However, unilinear is only
one line defined in terms of a single direction that, because it moves in a
single direction, precludes any possibility of new beginnings.26 On the
contrary, rectilinear movement is defined specifically by Arendt as the
movement of new beginnings that are unrestrained by unilinearity, by each
straight movement being reduced to an overarching and exterior, unilinear
logic or process.27 The socialization of labour, then. is the metamorphoSiS of
an activity that has no meaning other than self-preservation into an activity
with purpose outside of itself and which will sacrifice its very defining
principle, self-preservation. in aid of a single new-found purpose, in aid of a
unilinear logic.
So when Arendt states, "What all these theories in the various
sciences--economics, history, biology, geology--have in common is the
concept of process,"28 she does not mean the process of nature as fixed
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rotation or the conservative, individual, labour process of circular repetition
working to preserve the rectilinear movement of an individual's life. The
process movement of a labour ideology that has entered the public sphere has
become primarily a single-goal or single-purpose driven, unilinear
movement. A unilinear movement that. because it is based on the
unending struggle of life transformed into the limitless goal of progress or
historical inevitability, becomes itself unending: "the notion of an infinite
progress implicitly 'denies every goal and admits ends only as means to
outwit itself: "29 Arendt argues that "The inexhaustibility of [the] labor force
corresponds exactly to the deathlessness of the species, whose life process as a
whole is also not interrupted by the individual births and deaths of its
members."JO The unilinear "progression" this labour process generates is not
conservative and is not defined by fixed parameters but moves outward
endlessly according to the principle of infinite growth. While this movement..
at its base, requires the circular repetitive movement of collectivized
individuals, it has become.. most importantly, the outward unilinearity of
"progression."
When labour steps onto the stage of the public arena.. it alters or
replaces work and action, the two activities of the vita activa which are
properly related to the public world. Work has the potential to be. like labour,
circular in character. However, this circularity is not "repetitive," argues
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Arendt. but rather what she calls a procedure of "multiplication." Work is
predicated upon an idea or model which is separate from its pmduct and
lends itself "to an infinite continuation of fabrication."31 But this "infinite
continuation" is different from the movement of repetition: a craftsman does
not make multiple works because the activity of work requires it, because
there is anything necessary in the work itself that needs multiplication; "the
process is repeated for reasons outside itself and is unlike the compulsory
repetition inherent in laboring, where one must eat in order to labor and one
must lahor in order to eat."32 Labour, then.. is coincident with its movement,
cyclical repetition; the activity of work. the movement of work.. is separate
and distinct from its product. While labour is understood as an unending,
continuous process, the fabrication process is always carried out in a number
of separate and disconnected steps.33 On the other hand. the motives to
labour "come and go. and though they reappear again and again at regular
intervals. they never remain for any length of time. Multiplication. in
distinction from mere repetition. multiplies something that already possesses
a relatively stable, relatively permanent existence in the world.")" While
labour's repetitive activity is seen as constant and never-ending within an
individual life-span, its motivating force is disrupted and segmented. And
while work's activity of multiplication is understood to be separated and
disjointed, that which gives work the potential for multiplication. the idea or
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model, can be permanent and enduring.
Multiplication is not inherent to the activity of work. but is separate
from it and occurs for reasons outside of fabrication itself. In the modern age,
the primary reason for the multiplication of work arises because
utilitarianism-developing out of labour's infiltration into the public sphere-
is the dominant ideological principle of modem society. The modem age's
interest in labour arose because labour, not work or action. exemplified the
movement of the unending process. evident since the seventeenth century,
of growing wealth and property accumulation; attention. Arendt argues. "was
naturally drawn to the phenomenon of a progressing process itse1£."3S Within
the activity of work. the end defines the utility of everything needed for the
production of the object. The product of work never attains the status of an
"end in itself" because it is a use object and therefore a means to some other
end.36 Arendt continues, "The trouble with the utility standard inherent in
the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship between means and end
on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again
as a means in some other context. In other words, in a strictly utilitarian
worleL all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into
means for some further ends:'37 This is what Arendt calls "the philosophy of
homo faber par excellence:' and is caught up within the problematic
distinction between utility, what she call the "in order to," and meaning,
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what she calls the "for the sake of." "The perplexity of utilitarianism is that it
gets caught in the unending chain of means and ends without ever arriving
at some principle which could justify the category of means and end, that is,
of utility itself. The 'in order to' has become the content of the 'for the sake of';
in other words, utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness."38
The meaning of utility does not Lie within any particular thing or goal, in any
particular end, but rather its meaning lies in the process of utility itself which
has no meaning other that its particular movement, its particular process.
And to say that it is meaningless is only to say that its meaning is
characterized by a "vacuous" movement.
But is movement vacuous and meaningless in itself? Does movement
merely mediate between things or objects. having no objective significance of
its own? Arendt seems to argue in some passages that only things or objects
hold meaning: "Without a world between men and nature, there is eternal
movement, but no objectivity:'39 Meaning seems to be characteristic of
things, not of flux, transiency, or motion. "Meaning, on the contrary, must be
permanent and lose nothing of its character, whether it is achieved or, rather,
found by man or fails man and is missed by him."w Meaning is found in that
which has permanence, in things and not their movements, for movements
are nothing without the things which make them noticeable. However.
Arendt cannot be saying that movement as a whole is vacuous and
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meaningless, but rather only particular types of movement. Movements are
meaningful to the extent that, paradoxically. they promote or facilitate the
creation of stabilizing and durable things through human action. And the
chief kind of durable, public thing created by action is the polis. the republic.
The "thing" which Arendt believes meaningful is the political realm. and
this political realm will only retain its vitality and existence if action stabilizes
this realm-that is, maintains its existence-and makes it permanent.
1.3 Action and Movement
Action, the paramount human activity for Arendt, enables such
fundamental human qualities as identity and a "common sense," The
necessary condition of action is an arena where plurality can be exercised and
be disclosed. The key is freedom: "for action and politics, among all the
capabilities and potentialities of human life, are the only things of which we
could not even conceive without at least assuming that freedom exists."U
Arendt argues that the fundamental goal of politics is freedom. However, this
is not the freedom of possessive individualism, but rather a freedom that
pervades a plural group of people that have surpassed their initial earthly
necessities. Freedom and action, in the end, collapse into one: "Men are free--
as distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom-as long as they act,
neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same."42
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Action is the only human activity whose unique place of habitation is
the public sphere, the sphere where individuals come together to establish
their plurality and confirm a common reality. When one acts, one brings
something new into the world. Acting sets something into motion as does
every new birth. Action is an unfolding which occurs within plural
interaction. Human natality, the fact that we are born as new actors into the
world, provides us with the possibility for generating worldly change within a
political sphere. Each novel act, each event, is a beginning and is given
primacy by Arendt amongst all the activities of the vita activa. The novel is
given a higher starns than the ordinary because the ordinary is the regular
and continual struggle against necessity; life can only take on significance
once one steps beyond monotonous provision and enters the realm of the
politicaL Bringing about the novel in the political realm, through acting and
speaking.. is the very essence of freedom and the determining motion in the
revelation of individual identity. Identity is fluid and continually alters
within plural discourse. However, one does not enter the political realm of
action with a pre-formed identity that then undergoes alteration. Identity, like
reality, is only formed within plural interaction. Identity emerges and affirms
itself within a public realm of discussion and persuasion, collaboration and
debate.
In other words, Arendt does not think of this process of acting and
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speaking as one where each person is sovereign and self-determined. Rather,
action is the outcome of a plural mixing or interaction of people who are free
and equal. To say that people who enter such an opening of freedom are equal
is to say that they are no longer subject to the inequalities of necessity. Each
individual acts in a setting of free and equal discourse as an actor and not an
author. It is of the very essence of plural discourse that actions are not
detennined by anyone person but unfold in the context of a multitude of
voices sharing in dialogue.
Just as action and speech reveal individual identities. the political
realm also creates a shared space or reality. Action is part of worldliness and
always creates an opening or space which sets individuals apart from one
another and, at the same time, posits their reality. "Reality .. is first of all
characterized by 'standing still and remaining' the same long enough to
become an object for acknowledgement and recognition by a subject:'43 This
world of action provides both an objective and subjective reality. The
objective "in-between" provides a reality of objects and worldly or earthly
matters-speaking and acting are often directly related to the physical matters
of our existence. The subjective "in-between" does not concern physical,
tangible objects (yet always coexists with the objective reality), but rather is the
relation of words and deeds to each other, the relations between people. The
subjective "in-between" exists between agents and is made manifest through
32
their speech and action. This space, that works both to separate and unite
human beings, confinns within each person a shared reality through the
plurality of differing perspectives. The common "in-between" serves a double
function: firstly. it discloses reality through the obvious plurality of
individual perspectives, yet, secondly, this reality becomes a backdrop
whereby individuals may further differentiate their identities.
For Arendt, to be political is to be human, to be human is to be
political. The political realm of action is marked by courage and glory,
outstanding achievements and excellence. novelty and freedom, uniqueness
and individuality, the formation of human identity and the disclosure of
reality. To partake in action is to be human-to be deprived of or to rescind
one's participation in public action is to be less than human because private
life is lived in solitary confinement away from the world of plural men.""
The private sphere is necessary insofar as it provides both the physical
conditions of. and a stark contrast to, the public sphere. While Arendt
appreciates that everyone cannot act all the time, her political project
revolves around re-introducing the freeing and empowering activity of
action to the labour-minded modern age.
Action is a highly idealised form of human activity, an activity without
which we would not be human, and, as such. assumes its own modality of
movement: "To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to
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begin (as in the Greek word archein, 'to begin: 'to lead: and eventually 'to
rule: indicates), to set something into motion (which is the original meaning
of the Latin agere)."45 Action, as a movement, is characterized by its
indeterminateness and is wholly caught up with its impulse. its originating
thrust, its beginning. Action does not embody a "type" or "form" of
movement, but is a movement played out in terms of being not any
particular type of movement. It is important to realize, on the other hand,
that action can only be understood rectilinearly because it is a new begiruting:
the novelty of beginning breaks the circularity of necessity, stretching out
from its beginning in an undetermined rectilinear direction. Arendt notes
that the verb "to act" is historically linked to two different words for action
which correspond to its two parts, "the beginning made by a single person and
the achievement in which many join by 'bearing' and 'finishing' the
enterprise."-16 She remarks that it was the second meaning which became
dominant as the meaning for action in general, while the first took on a
specialized meaning in political language. The first meaning, as ruling and
leading, came to mean "to rule" and dropped its relation to leading.
Therefore, "the dependence of the beginner and leader upon others for help
and the dependence of his followers upon him for an occasion to act
themselves, split into two altogether different functions: the function of
giving commands, which became the prerogative of the ruler, and the
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function of executing them, which became the dUty of his subjects."47
Action, moreover, is not confined to a single beginning, but finds itself
implicated in the actions and reactions of others: "action, though it may
proceed from nowhere, so to speak,. acts into a medium where every reaction
becomes a chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new
processes. Since action acts upon beings who are capable of their own actions,
reaction, apart from being a response, is always a new action that strikes out
on its own and affects others. Thus action and reaction among men never
move in a closed circle and can never be reliably confined to two partners."-&8
Arendt continues, calling this the "boundless" quality of action, stating that
actions cut across boundaries and force open all limitations. Action.. as a non-
typical, non-specific movement, is neither circular or repetitive nor is it
determined unilinearity, for Arendt sees both circular and unilinear
movement as relentless, predetermined, law-defining movement. It is
precisely the human activity of leaving the safety of the self-preserving,
stabilizing movement of the life process and the artificial stability of the
unilinear movement of law-like ideology, that makes the undefined
rectilinear movement of action courageous and admirable. Action is a
movement that is unpredictable and undetermined. This is precisely what
separates humanity from nature; humans are capable of disrupting processes
and beginning things freshly with no pre-determined rhythm.
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Both of the above depictions of action offered by Arendt, as beginning
and finishing, refer to singular instances of the complete action: the point of
initiative and the point of completion. However Arendt also maintains that,
"the specific meaning of each deed, can Lie only in the performance itself and
neither in its motivation or achievement."49 The dynamic movement of
action has the appearance of rectilinearity only after the action processes have
been completed. This rectilinearity is derived from the fact that actions, like
individual human lives, can be depicted as having beginnings and ends.
"That every individual life between birth and death can eventually be told as
a story with beginning and end is the prepolitical and prehistorical condition
of history, the great story without beginning and end."so Arendt speaks of
actions in terms of events, a term which implies the backward glance of the
historian or storyteller attempting to comprehend the meaning of actions.
"The light that illuminates processes of action, and therefore all historical
processes, appears only at their end, frequently when all the participants are
dead. Action reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward
glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about
than the participants. All accounts told by the actors themselves, though they
may in rare cases give an entirely trustworthy statement of intentions, aims,
and motives, become mere useful source material in the historian's hands
and can never match his story in significance and truthfulness."S! Again, it is
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evident that "meaning" for Arendt can never be grasped in terms of
movement or motion but must be grasped in something which has stabilized
and situated itself concretely onto a written page, into a stable work. To
uncover meaning from action, Arendt stabilizes its ever·changmg movement
through the task of storytelling, through the concretization and arrest of the
motion inherent in action. The action, through this objectification, reveals its
full meaning.
It is indubitable that Arendt views all the activities of the vita activo in
relation to forms of movement. However, this is not the same as saying that
these forms of movement are meaningful to Arendt: for her, meaning is a
product of the "world" as distinct from the "earth." The movement Arendt
refers to and poses human action against is the movement of nature, the
initial, fundamental process movement. Distinctively human activities, on
the other hand, are understood as arising in contradistinction to the
movements of nature, to the movement of process, and this is precisely what
makes them human. But, as Canavan points out, "It would be a mistake to
suppose, however, that what she is doing is merely arbitrary, and that she is
imposing the metaphor of 'process' on the real world." In other words,
Arendt's use of movement when she refers to the human world is
metaphorical, because, as I have already shown, meaning for Arendt is only
found in stable, solid things and not their fleeting movements. To
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understand the world we must Look at concrete works and events. But. and
this is important, Arendt's explanation of the movement of nature or the
process movement of labour is not used metaphorically, but is used as an
explanation of their true nature, because they are not worldly and therefore
do not have any meaning other than their quasi-meaning as movement. In
the realm of nature, movement is the only way nature can be understood
because there is nothing durable enough for it to be endowed with meaning.
The reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact
that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by
which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than
the lives of their authors. Human life, in so far as it is world-building.
is engaged in a constant process of reification. and the degree of
worldliness of produced things, which altogether form the human
artifice, depends upon their greater or lesser permanence in the world
itself.52
What is meaningful and important to Arendt has some level of
permanence or durability; meaning requires the absence of, or arrest of, the
ever~changing transiency of movement. However, what Arendt does, on
occasion, is substitute one particular form of movement for movement itself,
for movement in general. When, for example, she states in The Origins of
Totalitarianism that, "In the interpretation of totalitarianism, all laws have
become laws of movement"53 or when she states that "Terror is the
realization of the law of movement,"54 she does not mean movement in
general but the particular movement of the labour process in the public
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sphere. And when Arendt argues in Tilt! Human Condition that. "without a
world between men and nature, there is eternal movement,. but no
objectivity."55 she means the eternal movement of circular repetition as
characterizing the process movement of an unworldly nature. Consequently,
action becomes the only form of "movement" with meaning, even though it
is only the initiation of a "'movement.H only a beginning characterized by its
absence from any particular or predetermined. form of movement (recall that
Arendt's predetermined movements are the three forms of the process
movement: first, the movement of nature as eternal, circular rotation fixed to
a single spot; second, the movement of the life process whose purpose, self-
preservation, is maintained by the circular, repetitive movement of labour
that.. at the same time. carries an individual forward, rectilinearly, from birth
to death; and. t:hird.. the movement of labour upon entering the public sphere
primarily understood as a swiftly progressing unilinear development). But
because action is not any particular type of movement, action cannot be
understood. for Arendt,. in terms of movement. It must be objectified by the
storyteller or historian into the concrete event where it is recognized and
endowed with its full meaning, with its sense of permanence or durability.
Arendt's analysis collapses, in the end, into the fundamental distinction
between transiency and stability, where stability endows meaning and where
movement is meaningless. But this, [ believe, is incoherent since Arendt's
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analysis of the vita activa is itself predicated on forms of movement.
I have entitled this thesis, "Breaking the Cycle." This expression was
not coined by myself, but by Arendt-in On RtvolutionS6-in response to the
novelty of both the birth of Christ and the French and American
Revolutions. The idea of a completely new occurrence was, she argues,
unthinkable before Christ because the pre-Christian world maintained a
cyclical time construct: novelty, according to Arendt, requires a rectilinear
time construct. Consequently, the Christian response to the absolute novelty
of Christ is critically important to Arendt's understanding of movement and
world change. As the first wholly novel event, the birth of Christ "constitutes
the origin of revolution" (revolution, we will see later, was the event that
broke the cycle of the secular or social and political world).57 We will also see
later, in The Life of the Mind, that a theory of the will was not developed
until the rise of Christianity when. according to Arendt, St. Augustine became
the first philosopher to speak of this faculty. The following chapter will look
at Arendt's first major work, her PhD thesis, Love and Saint Augustine, by
addressing the importance of beginning and novelty found in Augustine's
work.
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CHAPTER 2
Novelty and the Birth of Christ
Das Firmament blaut ewig, und die Erde
Wird lange fest steh'n und aufblUh'n im Lenz.
Du, aber, Mensch, wit lang lebst denn du?
Nicht hundert Jahre daftt du dich ergotzen
An all dem morschen Tande dieser Erde!
The firmament is ever blue, and the earth
Will long stand fast and bloom in spring.
But you, Man, how long do you live?
Not a hundred years are you permitted to delight
In all the decaying pleasures of this earth.
Gustav Mahler, Das Lied oon der Erde.1
Arendt's mapping of movement often confronted the aimless and
chaotic quality of human experience. Nature, first understood as a concoction
of haphazard movements, was later interpreted as endless cyclical rotation
when it was noticed that the heavens revolved in a regular, taw-like pattern.
The circular movement of the heavens equally characterized the experience
of labour: the repetitive, continual toil necessary for the perpetuation of the
We process. Meaningless. chaotic movement became understood as rhythmic,
cyclical pattern and was found to be operative and useful for human survival,
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necessary fot' the satisfaction of human needs. However we have seen that for
Arendt. cyclical movement, though functional. is itself "meaningless" in
virtue of its necessity, and is equated with interminable and perpetual
motion: "Every cyclical movement is a necessary movement by definition."2
By simply labouring repetitively and cyclically, members of the human
species reproduce the movement of nature-sustain their "metabolism with
nature" (Marx)-and remain animal laborans, bound by animalistic, organic
needs.
Yet,. for all its regularity, monotony, and insignificance, the life process
produces and perpetuates a life marked by a definite beginning and end. But
the rectilinear movement of this life cannot appear so unless it erects and
displays itself in a human artifice: circular, repetitive movement remains this
way until something.. as Arendt says, "breaks the cycle." Novelty breaks the
cosmological cycle because it breaks the rhythm of regular pattern, it breaks
the "eternal recurrence of the same," and requires for its comprehension a
"rectilinear time concept." The stories of human lives and the history of
humankind are impossible without human action. Action, something that
breaks the form of eternal rotation, discloses-through speech and deed-the
uniqueness of the agent. Actions are "events:' novel occurrences constitutive
of the public sphere. To act is "to set something into motion"] by means of
initiative and is viewed as a beginning. Action, Arendt's key social ideal, is
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the definitive property of human beings, i.e. the property that distinguishes
them from other animal species. and the world of nature more generally.
The fact of natality (that it is our birth and not our death that defines us
as human), so important to Arendt's idea of political action. enables action's
spontaneity and novelty. It was in her PhD thesis, Loue and Saint Augustine.
first published in 1929. that Arendt first developed the idea of natality; she
extracted the concept from Augustine's phrase. "that a beginning be made
man was created." That we can think of the beginning inherent in every
person,. the beginning of action implied in every person's birth, is the result of
the unworldly beginning implied in the birth of Christ. The result was a new
concept of history that saw time starting afresh from, what Arendt caBs. a
"tra1lsmundane beginning:' This transmundane beginning was the birth of
Christ and it ruptured the natural, cyclical movement of the pre-ehristian
world. At this point. the idea of a common humanity was devised, and
devised with a common rectilinear history originating out of the act of
creation. The birth of Christ was an historical event that had an immensely
important impact upon the world and upon Arendt's analyses of the world.
Arendt first confronts seriously the significance of Christianity in Lov~ and
Saint Augustin~. The results of that investigation influenced her thinking
throughout the rest of her life.
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By tracing the disparate strands of Saint Augustine's concept of love.
Arendt's PhD thesis, Love and Saint Augustine, evaluates the significance of
neighbourly love: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." More
specifically, Arendt questions how the authentic Christian individual, whose
truth and reality emanate out of an unworldly relation to God, "can be at all
interested in his neighbor."4 Augustine offers only one definition of love as
"craving" which conflicts, Arendt shows, with the "well-ordered" love of an
individual toward his neighbour. Her project is to understand how these two
seemingly incongruous understandings of love come to cohere in the
Christian social pursuit of neighbourly love; to show that "alienation from
the world and its desires by means of faith does not Simply cancel out the
togetherness of men."S
Augustine sees love as "a kind of craving." Love craves something
previously known or given and this something is outside itself. This exterior
thing determines love by defining its aim. An object is loved separately from,
or outside of its relation to, other things; it is loved. for its own sake, in and of
itself. The object of craving is a "good" because of the happiness that arises
from loving it. As a motion.. love is seen as both a forward movement toward
particular unrealized goals and, by retrieving from memory the happiness of
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past loves, the backward movement of memory providing the context for
individuals to choose what goods to love. While the active pursuit of love is
onward, it is predicated by the referential movement of memory. The goal of
love as craving is possession where, upon this realization, we find happiness
and our love ceases. The very fact that things are desired at all points to a
situation of human dependence upon exterior things.6
Whereas happiness arises out of the possession of goods, fear of loss is
understood as evil. The difficulty, Arendt proceeds to explain, is that
according to Augustine our loving rarely leads to possession. Most of the
objects we crave are "temporal," lacking the durability necessary to prevent
the fear of loss. Food, for example, is a temporal good which quickly perishes.
We do consume food before it perishes, but it cannot always be stored for
future use and we cannot guarantee its future availability without our
continual labour.7 Consequently, the "temporal" character of food prevents
us from attaining the happiness of its secure possession. Happiness arises,
then, not only from the possession of goods but by preventing the fear of their
future loss. Human beings are dependent upon an outside world that is not
even dependable itself. However, Arendt argues that the "enOrmOuS
importance of security... is due to the condition of man and not to the objects
he desires."8 In other words, temporal goods are not the root of the problem
but humanity itself whose condition is temporal; humans are mortal beings
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whose "life on earth is a living death."9 Augustine maintains that while
every person's desires and aversions differ, everyone wishes to live such that
happiness is found in life itself and not in its particular goods. But love of life
can never be happy because life will never be possessed, because of the fear of
inevitable death. A truly happy life is one that does not fear death because it
lasts forever.
Because the true nature of life is caught in a dialectical relation with
death and because life is the foremost good, love's ultimate goal is freedom
from the fear of death. Death marks the loss of life and therefore aU particular
goods, signifying a general rule of love, a general fact of the human condition:
love as craving can never end in durable possession because we only hold
things temporarily; self-direction and self-definition are always only partial
and momentary. "Only a present without a future is immutable and utterly
unthreatened. In such a present lies the calm of possession."lO This
possession. for Augustine. is not defined by what is possessed or who
possesses but by the non-temporal concept of eternity. Eternity indicates a self-
determined existence lived in a "present without a future"; it is the happy
security of a present free of future fear. free of impending loss. Earth!y life, on
the contrary, is characterized by mutability. impermanence. and is. as Arendt
cites Augustine. what never "stands still."ll The eternal. the permanent. is
what reveals itseU as forever present, without past or future. rooted in the
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still calm of rest.
Love's aim. as previously stated, is defined by what it craves. According
to Augustine, love can be defined in two different ways: love as cupiditas and
love as caritas.12 Put simply, cupiditas is love of the world and the things in it
and caritas is love of God, Being, or the eternal. Whether we choose caritas or
cupiditas we choose where we want to live, in the city of God, civitas Dei, or
in the earthly city, civitas lemma. Cupiditas is mundane and loves "the
wrong object" whereas carjtas. the "right love," is transcendent. But God is
not the criterion for deciding whether cupiditas or caritas is the right or
wrong love, and neither is the self. The criterion of worthy love is "the self
who will be eternal," it is "the eternity that lies ahead."lJ
Love ought to turn its desire to what will last forever, to what will
assure it an everlasting life, because a love that craves earthly things (and
therefore their inherent temporality) will never be satisfied: "Whatever can
be taken away from a lasting enjoyment for its own sake cannot possibly be
the proper object of desire."14 Because all temporal goods disappoint.
authentic love rejects all particular goods in favour of the security of an
absolute future, in favour of caritas. Arendt argues, "Thus, Augustine
proceeds to strip the world and all temporal things of their value and to make
them relative. All worldly goods are changeable (mutabilia). Since they will
not last, they do not really exist. They cannot be relied upon."15 What makes
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life and worldly goods changeable is their temporal reference to the past and
the future; they change out of a past and into a future. It is this quality that
prevents them from being durably possessed and, what is more important.
from having a meaning and even existence. Yet because humans register
time within a consciousness composed of memory and expectation, human
life is saved from getting lost within meaningless relativity. Memory
preserves the past in the present and expectation equally projects its future
goals from this present, the present Augustine calls the "Now."16 This Now
ties together the past and future within a conscious "space" making time
meaningful: without the space of the Now, time could not be rendered at all
and life would be perpetual, indistinguishable motion. "For a fleeting
moment (the temporal Now) it is as though time stands still, and it is this
Now that becomes Augustine's model of eternity for which he uses
Neoplatonic metaphors-the nunc stans or stans aeternitah·s."17
There are correct and incorrect love objects. These love objects are
determined via the themes of eternity vs. mortality, the permanent vs. the
impermanent, which weave themselves throughout Arendt's thesis. The
world is continually caught within processes of change, is caught up in the
movement from the past and into the future defined by the ultimate
beginning and end: birth and death. Ufe is fleeting, unstable, and unreliable.
By contrast the object of caritas is not subject to inconstancy but exists
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independently in a state of rest. The eternal is the very absence of movement:,
the absence of the movement that so characterizes the world's objects and
desires. It transpires that at the very root of Augustine's philosophy, there are
preconceptions and valuations that hinge upon notions of movement. What
defines his writing and his types of love, Arendt argues, is "a deep
dissatisfaction with what the world can give its lovers."18 Things of the
world, e.g., a work of art, can provide some level of endurance and can
provide the medium through which people attain some level of permanence.
But to love, through cupiditas, worldly things does nothing to rescue the
deteriorating nature of life, since "No earthly goods can lend support to life's
instability."19
Arendt is interested in the concept of love in Augustine's work because
love. defined as craving, signifies human dependence upon things exterior to
us. This existence would not be so terrible if the world's objects upon which
we depend were themselves reliable. But the things at our disposal cannot
even be depended upon to secure our existence. Human beings are not self-
sufficient, but isolated--from the world and from God. Augustine sees
isolation and lack of self-sufficiency as the only "essential nature" humans
could have, because humans "always [desire] to belong to something outside
[themselves}."2o Yet by liVing in the civitas terrena, by loving through
cupiditas, humans become estranged from themselves by living for and
49
through those things external to us. "By desiring and depending on things
'outside myself: that is, on the very things I am not, I lose the unity that
holds me together by virtue of which I can say 'I am: "21 The process of
becoming part of the world and its history Augustine calls "dispersion," and
is comforting because it distracts from the fear of loss. On the other hand,
dispersion also means the loss of the self to this world by "desiring and
depending....on the very things that I am not." And it is this self that is the
only link between a dependent humanity and its God. By turning away from
the world and withdrawing into the self, individuals "become a question to
themselves" because, within the self, one comes to realize "that this self is
even more impenetrable than the 'hidden works of nature: "22 The
consequent of becoming lost within ourselves, of not knowing who we are, is
a turning to God for guidance about ourselves. "Self-discovery and discovery
of God coincide. because by withdrawing into myself I have ceased to belong
to the world. This is the reason that God then comes to my help."23 The self is
then the necessary element leading us toward the civitas Dei and away from
the dependence and insecurity of the world.
Even the timeless present of the Now is only of our consciousness and
does not provide the stability necessary to alter the conditions of our material
bodies. Fearless eternity exists as a good only beyond our world. in the city of
God, and cannot grant us an immortality of this world. This eternity we crave
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is life as Being, the transcendent essence of life that is permanent and
everlasting, the source of all life or God. By loving Being, human essence as
opposed to human existence, we love our selves. Consequently. caritas tries to
step beyond human existence, attempts to transcend our earthly lives, by
anticipating the eternal. But because this eternity, extraneous to the mortal
world, is craved. it takes on a temporal character, can be reached only in the
future, and, as a result loses the timeless nature of eternity. While this may
be a contradiction,24 it is what prOvides Augustine with the explanation for
the ground of eternal life: that the eternity exterior to humanity and its world
is related to human love and its craving.
The project of striving for eternity, of transcending our earthly lives,
"can be actualized only in the form of a radical negation of the present."2S
Love of the self, for Augustine, means disdain of the worldly self, of the self
that is temporal and will die. Caritas also leads to a forgetting of the self:
"Craving the world, he forgets his self and forgets the world; discovering that
he cannot find his self except in the craving for God, he forgets his self."26
This move Augustine calls the "transit" and denotes complete self-oblivion
by obliterating the social and historical context of the individual. The
transition from temporality to eternity destroys the historical roots of
individuals so they may exist in a pure state of love, so they may exist
"extended" and "straining forward" to the absolute future that is God. Yet
51
temporality and the world cannot be ignored by the lover of caritas. The
correct attitude to the world, Augustine believes, is use in contrast to the
enjoyment attained from the world by the lovers of cupiditas.27 Caritas uses
things only as they are useful for attaining the final good of God. As a result..
"the world loses its independent meaningfulness and thus ceases to tempt
man."28
Both caritas and cupiditas forget the self, but whereas cupiditas forgets
by leaving the self for the external world, can"tas forgets by escaping into the
self from the world. In other words. caritos does not efface the self altogether
but only forgets so that it may reward the self (the Being or essence of the seIO
with the eternity of an afterlife. Caritas frees the individual from fear because
it attaches its love to eternity-something that is not subject to deterioration or
loss. Death, the ultimate fear of humanity on earth, becomes meaningless and
"His own self, not as it is but as it will be, [becomes] self-sufficient."29 The
potential freedom of caritas on earth is love as craving and effectively
mediates between the desiring individual and the desired freedom-etemity.
The lover of caritas cannot remain forever "straining forward" while
still existing upon the earth. The return to the world is necessary (beyond the
necessity of prOViding for our material needs) because of the Christian
command to '10ve thy neighbor as thyself"-even if this seems inconsistent
with love as caritas. Arendt argues, "Obviously there is no answer to this
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question [why we should have any worldly relation to OUf neighbour] in this
conceptual framework [love as caritas) except the divine commandment itself.
which appears here like a deus ex machina."30 However, the expected
absolute future provides individuals with the means for regulating the love
of the world: by striving for eternity, we gain "a point of reference that lies. in
principle, outside the world itself, and which therefore can now serve as
regulator of all things inside the world as well as of the relationships by
which they are interconnected."Jl The result is an ordering of love that
prescribes what things ought to be loved above others. This "point of
reference" is what teaches us to use the world's things rather than enjoy
them, to use them for the sake of our "higher good"-the eternal or God. The
impersonal, impartial form of judgement that arises cannot, on the other
hand, be understood in terms of love as craving. The absence of desire
produces a "well-ordered" love and is a sign of fearlessness and indifference.
Neighbours are loved not in their individuality but because they are human
and, too, can aid the goal of future striven eternity. This, Arendt argues,
destroys the meaning of neighbourly love because it uses them like any other
object,. preventing neighbours from being loved for their own sake. How,
then, does Augustine rescue the significance of the neighbour?
Arendt notes that Augustine's striving for happiness, for the absolute
future, has forgotten his earlier tenet that all notions of happiness arise out of
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the past. Memory, therefore. provides the content of expectation; it is only by
recalling the past into the present that the future is projected out of the Now.
The eternity we desire can only be conceptualized from an original experience
of the eternal, from the transmundane memory of our creation. "Straining
forward" is actually the attempt to return, to reach backwards, to God. Arendt
tells us to define our existence from whence we came rather than by whither
we go; let birth, natality, determine our existence, not death, mortality.32
Transmundane recollection "clearly shows that desire is not free-floating,
arising, as it were, from nowhere."33 The significance of neighbourly love is
reinstated because, rather than existing as mere material for a future goat
love reminds us of our origin-God our creator. "Every particular act of love
receives its meaning, its raison d'etre, in this act of referring back to the
original beginning, because this source, in which reasons are sempitemal
(rationes sempiternae), contains the ultimate and imperishable 'reason' for all
perishable manifestations of existence."34
By comprehending existence from the standpoint of natality, existence
becomes more bearable and something we should be grateful for. "This will to
be under all circumstances is the hallmark of man's attachment to the
transmundane source of his existence."35 While human existence is defined
by being "always in motion"-as opposed to the still permanence of the
Creator-it manages, despite this movement, to hold some meaning by
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"relating back to its origin."36 What Augustine calls the "stigma of all created
things"37-their temporality and perishability-is a movement that arose out
of its origin in the non-movement of God. But the origin of humanity does
not represent the origin of movement as such. it represents the introduction
of a new, properly called novel, movement in the universe.
...man was created into time, but time itself was created simultaneously
with the world, namely, together with motion and change. Not only is
time unthinkable without the existence of "some creature by virtue of
whose movement time could pass:' but movement is unthinkable
without the notion of passing time. Moreover, the beginning that was
created with man prevented time and the created universe as a whole
from turning eternally in cycles about itself in a purposeless way and
without anything new ever happening. Hence, it was for the sake of
novitas, in a sense, that man was created. Since man can know, be
conscious of, and remember his "beginning" or his origin, he is able to
act as a beginner and enact the story of mankind.38
"Human" movement creates a rupture in the "purposeless" movement of
the universe-never-ending cyclical movement--by imposing a rectilinear
movement between birth and death. Each rectilinear movement is
meaningful to the extent that it is new and individual and because its
oriented purpose can collapse the past and future within the present, the
Now, where movement may approach or imitate the non-movement of
eternity. Such an imitation of eternity Augustine calls sempiternity--the
"moving image of etemity"-and calls its process "sempiternal Becoming."39
Only through contemplating "the absolute present of eternity," where the
past and future become exchangeable, does movement attain meaning and
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import. "Only man, but no other mortal being, lives toward his ultimate
origin while living toward the final boundary of death. Since he can
concentrate through remembrance and anticipation his entire life into the
present, man can participate in eternity and thus be 'happy' even in this
life."ol0
Caritas marks itself as an authentic choice because where it is natural to
love and embrace the world, it takes the will of choice to tum one's love to
the Creator. This choice is predicated, however, upon the more fundamental
choice God made to love his creatures. The "choice out of the world"41 is the
overt recognition of our dependence upon God and our place, as creatures,
within the overarching relationship of God to the universe. By choosing to
love what lies beyond our world, individuals admit their insecure knowledge
of what they are and their want of God's grace to show them their Being. To
accept, rather than choose, cupiditas, is to covet the world and believe that a
person's will and 'know-how' is sufficient for establishing truth and reality.
The ease with which humanity accepts this earthly existence is the
consequent of letting "habit" dictate our actions.42 The "force of habit" the
rule of cupiditas, is the identification of today and every tomorrow with a
particular yesterday. Habit causes us to cling to a singular past a past that is of
mortal making, and by that denies its origin in, and dependence upon, God.
As the "law of sin," habit perpetuates the original sin of Adam., the particular
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past of cupiditas.
To counter the force of habit, Augustine proposes the "conscience" of
God that directs us away from habit in an inescapable way. Conscience gives
human beings a direct link. to God and commands "Thou shalt not covet."
Rather, one must reject the historical, material world for the eternity of
Being. While God had previously only related to His creation through the
remembered past and anticipated future, here God confronts humans in the
present of their existence as "the Creator who makes demands on the
creature:, ..3 As the divine command, God relates to concrete, temporal
creatures instructing them by Law. "God is no longer understood as the
Supreme Being, which as eternity presents the eternal law simultaneously in
all its several parts, but as the ever-present authority that man keeps
confronting on his way through life."44 God presents himself to us in the
world. While we may have the will to follow the divine law, we do not have
the power to do so and thus we are left in need. of the grace of God. "This tum
is no longer a simple relation to God, but a direct plea for his help. God's
function is changed from that of a Creator to a giver and helper:'45 Only those
who are humble, willing their lives through the law, find the power of God's
grace.
The world remains empty and meaningless to the lover of caritas, but
now he is accompanied by God who is in him. "In sel£~denial, man acts 'as
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God' toward himself. He (oves himself as God loves him, hating everything
he has made in himself. and loving himself only as far as he is God's creation.
What he loves in himself is exclusively God's goodness, the Creator."-I6 By
loving the world as God's creation. the i.ndividual loves his neighbour as a
creation of God. Equally he loves himself as a created being. "The prerequisite
of the right comprehension of my neighbor is the right comprehension of
myself."-l7 Neighbourly love is impartial love: we love neighbours purely
because they are exemplary of creation, not because they are good or evil.
Christian or non-Christian. We love the eternal being or essence of our
neighbour for the sake of the eternal, not the mortal neighbour for his own
sake. By loving our neighbour we love our eternal source, not the neighbour.
Yet to love one's neighbour already means that the lover is isolated and has
cut all worldly ties. Lovers are provided with the context for how to love their
neighbours. On the other hand, Arendt argues that Augustine has yet to
explain the neighbour's role in relation to the lover or how the lover
reinstates worldly interactions with neighbours from the standpoint of love
as caritas that is, we have seen, transcendent and unworldly.
The import of neighbourly love lies in the faith that neighbours hold
between each other. As neighbours believing together, they comprise a
"community of faith" bound by "a specific possibility" and demanding
complete and undivided cooperation.48 While this faith is each of theirs
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individually, it is, equally, theirs in common. Individuals are related to each
other in common on the grounds of. what Arendt calls, a "twofold origin:' ~9
In tenns of the community of faith, individuals are linked historically to the
death of Christ who redeemed himself not for individuals but foro all of
humankind as lived on earth. Secondly, individuals are "'rooted" to each
other through their genealogical origin in Adam. This kinship descending
from Adam is of "situation" because of their share in the fate of mortality, in
original sin. These two sources of community, Christ and Adam, reveal,
consecutively, the "equality of all people before God" and the human
situation of "mutual interdependence."so
These two sources represent the two cities: the civitas terrena,
grounded in Adam, which all are born into and the civitas Dei, by which
Christ provided the necessary salvation for its realization. The civitas terrena
is based historically and biologically in Adam and establishes indirectly. by
generation, the equality of humankind. Here the notion of the being of man
concerns the nature of the entire human race. The dependence on the origin
of our creation. on the other hand, is, again, historical. The historical presence
of Christ provides humans with their link. to God. Neighbourly love arising
out of these historical contexts provides concrete equality along with
demanding social obligations. The neighbour relates to the lover in two
possible ways: first, a neighbour who has already devoted himself to caritas is
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the lover'5 partner and shares with him in the grace of God; and, second. a
neighbour is someone devoted to ctlpiditas and reminds the lover of the
existence he would continue to live were it not for God's grace.51 As long as
the world exists it is relevant to the believer as something to be overcome. Yet
this "conquest" of the world is only possible to the faithful acting in concert,
such that absolute solitude, as long as we remain part of the world, becomes
impossible.
Neighbourly love derived from the source of Adam is dependent love.
r love my neighbour because he shares the common fear of death. the
common fate of mortality. "Only in Christianity is death viewed as 'the wages
of sin' (Saint Paul) rather than an event of nature and as the peril common to
al1."52 Death, W\derstood more poignantly here as the "eternal death which is
the punishment of sin:' continues forever in a world dominated by cupiditas.
The introduction of Christ, however, removes the communal fear of death,
transforming it into an individual fear and therefore freeing the individual
for future salvation. "Death can now mean salvation for the goOd."5J The
love of neighbour emanating from the knowledge of Christ is mutual and
acted out as the imitation of our Creator's love for His creation. The danger of
losing the eternal after death is something all individuals face. Therefore, this
is not love of the species because of its plight as a species, but love of every
individual in the isolation of their relation to the Eternal, to God: "the
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human race as such is not in danger, but every individual is."S-I
While the lover of caritas loves the individual neighbour because of
his equally essential relation to God. the lover does not love the neighbour
for his own sake: I love my neighbour because the source of Christ tells me
my duty is to help my neighbour to love the correct object, to help my
neighbours toward caritas. In other words, I love him objectively for his
relation to the Etemal and only because it yields a direct relation between me
and God. "We are commanded to love our neighbour... only because in so
doing we love Christ. This indirectness breaks up social relations by turning
them into provisional ones."S5 Love of neighbour is only important for
attaining the eternity that lies beyond the transient nature of our world.
The origin in Adam and the origin in Christ serve, together, to define
neighbourly love through caritas: My very descent from Adam provides me
with the context for interacting with my neighbours. Yet these individuals do
not properly become my "neighbours" until I, having returned from my
isolating inquiry into myself and by that into God, obtain the reference point
outside the world for seeing each neighbour in their own isolated reference to
God. In my eyes, each individual neighbour loses his social and historical
particularity and becomes one of many individuals who join me in pursuit of
the eternal. It is this very detachment from our social and historical locus that
frees us from the transience of our restless existence and enables future
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salvaticn through Christ.
Lov~ and Saint Allgustille proved to be a vital part of Arendt's later
thought. It provided her with a sense of how a rectilinear account of history
emerged. Such an account was consistent with her own emphasis on
spontaneity and novelty. The birth of Christ was a moment which
symbolized an entirely new event in the world; an event that exploded
movement as circular recurrence. Christianity reworked the movement of
human Life; it transformed the unending recurrence of individual lives into a
collective humanity descending from a common origin in both God and
Adam. However, this reinterpretation only altered a portion of the human
understanding of time: cyclical. law-like movement continued to define the
political. social, and natural orders regardless of the rectiHnearity of private,
individual Hfe-spans. Rectilinearity, and therefore "meaning," could only be
possessed or experienced by individual Christians enacting private
beginnings, who turned from the world into their private selves to learn of
humanity's beginning in God.
Not until the modern age do we find the circular movement of the
secular realm conceptualized in rectilinear terms. The discovery of the New
World followed by a reinvigorated exploration of the remainder of the earth,
the rapidly growing individual accumulation of wealth, the equally rapid
growing accumulation of knowledge in the sciences, the discovery in
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America that poverty is not necessary or naturally allotted according to a
predestined social order, and the infiltration of labour into the public sphere
provided the historical conditions for breaking the cycle of the secular world.
But by recognizing the immense possibilities of human action, by realizing
that the social and political order and its change were not regular and
predestined but amenable to alteration, even control. by human effort, people
lost sight of the immense responsibilities that accompany human action. In
other words, not all fonns of linear movement and fresh beginnings are
constructive and honourable; in fact some may be disastrous, destroying the
potential freedom of action. The idea of an unending.. forward-driven process
operating according to a law-like logic of movement (the idea of unilinear
movement), rather than founding and establishing a political situation that
stabilizes and comes to rest in the manifestation of a body politic, lurked
behind the Nazi and Stalinist regimes of the twentieth century. The following
chapter looks at Arendt's analysis of totalitarian rule, The Origins of
Totalitarianism, by probing the arguments behind Arendt's claim that
totalitarianism is indeed a "movement" and only secondarily a party and a
state.
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CHAPTER 3
Totalitarianism and the Movement of Process
When the Nazis talked about the law of nature or when the
Bolsheviks talked about the law of history, neither nature nor history
is any tonger the stabilizing source of authority for the actions of
mortal men; they are movements in themselves.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
The Origins of Totalitarianism. first published in 1951, marked a major
shift in Hannah Arendt's interests. The world of politics now took centre
stage in her thinking, as she reflected on the shattering experience of fascism
and Stalinism. Yet into this political world Arendt took many insights from
her reading of Augustine including the importance of beginning, the concept
of natality, and particular understandings of the world and of freedom.
Greatly influenced by issues of time and space, Love and Saint Augustine
prepared Arendt to look at the world of politics in a highly idiosyncratic way.
What has been found in The Human Condition, and what I will come to
show in Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism and On Revolution, is
Arendt's interest in the historical construction of time concepts and her
interest in the artificial movement of politics as opposed to the regular
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movement of nature. That Arendt looked at politics, and the modem world
more generally, in terms of movement may have originated in her work on
Augustine, who saw temporality as man's fundamental existential condition.
Hannah Arendt shows us in The Origins of Totalitarianism that the
totalitarian form of government is altogether different from previous
political systems that have operated during the last two thousand years. The
rise of totalitarian movements created a rupture in the history of political
organization; a rupture which developed, she argues, in the wake of "the
crisis of our century" I-the disintegration of the European nation-state. This
crisis became more apparent and the degeneration more assured when
totalitarian governments become fully established. The unprecedented
change in governmental form lies in the difference between the constitutions
of the declining nation·state and the evolving totalitarian movement: a
change in the status between the transient character of human actions and the
stabilizing effects of the state and its law. Totalitarian movements radically
alter this opposition by breaking down the ever~changingactions of men into
the monolithic behaviour of an homogenous mass and destroying
government stability in favour of an ideological principle of unending
imperialist expansion and the inevitable movement of evolutionary
progress. Totalitarian government sacrifices the plurality of humans for
abstract laws of movement; laws no longer serve to stabilize the
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unpredictability of heterogenous men, for the mass man acts wholly in
accordance with the inexorable motion of ":History."
The European nation-state, as it had developed since the French
Revolution, was a product of the relation between a people's national
consciousness and a particular territory which this people could call its own.
The two components of the nation-state, nationality and state, interrupted the
migration of peoples and fixed them according to their newly conceptualized
common social origin.2 Arendt points out that while nationalism was fairly
new, the state's existence had been born of centuries of government aimed at
establishing the security of a people and acting as the custodian of law. By
operating according to "positive laws" (laws claiming to be "eternal" and
which supposedly stand outside individual actions and particular generations
and extend beyond the borders of specific states), nation-states created the
space required for the freedom of actions and thoughts. Nation-states, acting
as guarantors of positive law, provided the stability necessary to regulate the
unpredictable actions of men. The degeneration of the nation-state began
when the notion of nationality overtook the concept of the state as lawgiver
and protector of all its inhabitants. Nationalism redefined citizenship in
terms of a person's biological birth and supported. "common" political rights
for only those people that satisfied. a given line of descent
Arendt argues that individuals, by virtue of their birth into the world,
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are spontaneous and unpredictable and have the capability of initiating things
anew. Positive laws have important consequences for the novelty of human
actions because they "hedge in each new beginning and at the same time
assure its freedom of movement, the potentiality of something entirely new
and unpredictable... they guarantee the preexistence of a world, the reality of
some continuity which transcends the individual life span of each
generation, absorbs all new origins and is nourished by them."J Positive laws
stabilize the potential political difficulties of diverse and unforeseeable
actions by instructing people about what they ought not to do. By not telling
people what to do, such laws also allow for the freedom of decision. Arendt
sees these laws as "fences," providing the necessary space between people for
action. Actions require "freedom of movement;" positive laws-like fences-
create boundaries to prevent any radically free sense of action but leave
individuals the greatest possible room for movement. Positive laws claim to
derive their authority from "Nature or Divinity" linking individuals to an
eternal, over-arching moral code that stretches across generations and the
differing origins of people. And they sustain the context of a continuous,
changing world by "absorbing all new origins" and being "nourished by
them." With the advent of nationalism, the ability of positive laws to "absorb
new origins" became increasingly difficult and the plight of Jews, in
particular, became increasingly precarious.
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The Jews had attained, at the peak of the nation·state's development in
the nineteenth century, equality of rights in their status as dtizens.~ However.
by the time the Nazis took control of Germany, they were considered only
second-class citizens and !ater would be denied any political rights at all.
Arendt points out that "of all European peoples, the Jews had been the only
one without a state of their own;"s they were "without a government.
without a country, and without a language."6 The fact that they were a
"rootless" people, the only truly "European" people. in a period of intensified
nationalism meant that. because of their stateless condition. they were subject
to the whim of state systems which recognised only legitimate nationals.
Arendt outlines the many roles Jews played within the nation-state and the
special privileges that some attained working as financiers for the bourgeois
class. This particular set of Jews were afforded a higher status than the
ordinary citizen. The remaining Jews, on the other hand, were disadvantaged
greatly as their rights gradually eroded in the face of the nationalist onslaught.
At the same time as the nation-state began its decline, Imperialism
intensified. The special status Jews lost their dominant position as financiers
of the state because they were not "imperialistically minded."7 Yet individual
Jews, later seen as representative of Jews in general, held positions as
middlemen and financial advisors. Ironically, while they became
"representative" Jews, the dismantling of the Jewish business community
68
into singular businesses isolated them entirely from their fellow Jews.
Viewed as non-national, rootless people and as superfluous wealth holders,
the Jews became the victims of a growing antisemitism. "To be uprooted
means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to
be superfluous means not to belong to a world at aIL"S
The connection of Imperialism to the nation-state furthered the
nation-state's destruction. States are delineated by boundaries which separate
them from other states and define, for example, spheres of govemance and
economic activity. Imperialism, on the other hand, whose ultimate principle
is never-ending political expansion, is based upon the idea of continual
centrifugal movement that, respecting no limits, believes expansion to be an
end in itself.9 What is odd about this entirely new political ideal to is that it is
not political in essence, but rather originates from the economic
developments of a growing capitalist world. Expansion suited the world of
business and industry because, Arendt argues, "the productivity of man... is,
indeed, unlimited."ll Imperialism developed as a reaction to the political
limitations on economic growth: as businesses exhausted the material
potential within single states they pushed governments toward imperialist
expansion in the hopes of procuring the resources of other countries. The
natural tendency of economic production is towards unlimited growth,
unlimited movement, that has to be released from the bonds of the nation-
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state.
In imperialist politics, the home country is important only as the base
or origin of rule over acquired territory; won nations merely signal the ability
and necessity to move further and acquire more and as such are not valued in
themselves. Each singular victory merely signifies the inevitable success of
expansion and the necessity to move quickly on; each victory signifies an
increase in power and the inescapable desire to attain greater power. Capital
begets capital; power begets power. Arendt argues, "not the naive delusion of
a limitless growth of property, but the realization that power accumulation
was the only guarantee for the stability of so-called economic laws, made
progress irresistible."12 The combination of economic growth with political
expansion unleashed the "political emancipation of the bourgeoisie" and
discovered "the true principle of perpetual motion" that, at least theoretically,
was "unable to stop and to stabilize."13 Arendt remarks: "the philosophical
correlative of the inherent instability of a community founded on power is
the image of an endless process of history which, in order to be consistent
with the constant growth of power, inexorably catches up with individuals,
peoples, and finally all mankind."14 The ultimate result of inexorable
economic progress through political expansion is not simply the tangible
acquisition of territory and capital, but instead a "logical" process, a type of
motion. which defines every action and everyone that enters into its path in
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terms of a natural, necessary movement: "once [the mass manJ has entered
the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, he will, as it were, cease
to be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with
anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole
process in motion; he will think of himself as mere function, and eventually
consider such functionality, such an incarnation of the dynamic trend, his
highest possible achievement." 15 This logical process, understood as a law of
movement, interprets all actions in terms of the eventual direction of the
movement and sacrifices all individual interests for the sake of the
movement of imperialism. Whe!1 understood in the light of mutually
competitive imperialism, the only logical outcome of this movement is the
eventual swvival of a single victorious empire at the expense of destroying a
varying political world. The only logical conclusion to such a movement is
the destruction of mankind: a catastrophe which sacrifices both those people
in its path and sacrifices the spontaneous, unpredictable nature of humanity
in those who carry forward such a movement.
How. then, did totalitarian movements tie territory~bound nationalism
to this ever-expanding imperialism? As the concept of "nation" overtook that
of the "state," nationality became defined in terms of blood-lines and the
national soul. The divorce of national feeling from particular territories and
particular political and cultural achievements intensified to the point that
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groups became hostile to the very notion of a state. Such hostility grew in the
most part out of a people who. seeing the state-designated nationalism of
Western nations, developed nationalistic principles despite their lack of
common territory.t6 Arendt refers to this development (arising from the
rootlessness of "the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, or
the Balkan countries") as "tribal nationalism."17 Tribal nationalism, in its
extreme form, became manifest in the pan-movements of the Gennans and
Slavs and adopted racial theories of divine chosenness. As chosen peoples,
the pan-movements aspired to dominate those who were not equal nationals;
all other peoples were ipso facto inferior and would eventually come to ruin.
lt is not surprising that antisemitism developed out of the pan-movements,
considering the Jews' own claim to chosenness that had persisted for more
than two thousand years. The Jews also presented to the pan·movements an
example of a people who, even though rootless and without a state, had built
a strong national identity. The Jewish heritage, envied by the pan-Germans
and pan-Slavs, was obvious competition; the only way to prove the
movement's ideology of chosenness was to stamp out all competing
ideologies, to destroy all other races.
These racial ideologies, Like the economic ideology that animated
imperialism, relied upon a reading of history as inevitable process. The
process of racial domination emanated from a belief in chosenness and the
nclaim "to know the hidden truth about otherwise incomprehensible facts" as
befits a universal theory.1S The future of these chosen peoples is the
preordained outcome of a nab.1ral progression of history. All occurrences or
events are seen in the light of this eventual realization and are integrated
into such a history no matter how contradictory they may seem. The hidden
truth in a universal theory of racial or imperialistic domination is the truth
of a particular type of motion or movement. The movement of capital. like
the movement of power, like the movement of a chosen people, are all
unavoidable and predetermined, they are future~verified, and map a
unilinear pattern of movement.19 The common logic of movement allowed
pan-nationalist ideologies to weave together the political force of
totalitarianism.
By linking an antisemitic ideology with an imperialist ideology, Arendt
offers an explanation for the rise of the Nazi totalitarian movement.
Totalitarian rr.ovements, of which Nazism and Stalinism are exemplary. are
to be understood rightly as "movements" in their opposition to the security
and stability of the "state." In opposition to parties, movements offer a
political dynamism free of state ties, class interests, and party policies. In fact..
totalitarian governments dismantled key features of the class system by
destroying the common horizontal interests that tie people to classes. And
because one's class position tended to determine one's political affiliations,
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the collapse of a conspicuous class system meant the collapse of political
parties. What remained were masses of atomized individuals, isolated from
each other. unpolitical and asocial, but who comprised the material means for
fulfilling the movement of totalitarianism. By refraining from declaring any
fixed or specific political policy, totalitarian regimes were able to prevent the
masses from developing political views dependent upon tangible goals. The
only thing left to pin the masses' isolated individualism upon was the
abstract ideal of political movement. Their absolute loyalty to these laws of
movement was carried out in an unemotional and automatic way, as their
contribution to the unavoidable process. Membership in the party at least
assured a confident involvement in Universal World History or the Law of
Nature.
Totalitarian movements introduce a political system that is the very
embodiment, and vindication of, transiency and motion. Operating by
abstract laws of movement (Le. the law of Nature; the law of History),
totalitarianism stifles the incalculable and spontaneous character of humans,
stabilizing people into a predictable and homogenous mass. Actively
practicing the idea of expansion for expansion's sake, totalitarianism takes
imperialism one step farther by dissolving any notion of a stable home, any
ties to a stable state or territory, for the logic of a law of movement.
Totalitarians do not respect borders and consider the whole earth their
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eventual domain. Grounded in the concept of an ideology and the practice of
terror, totalitarianism destroys all positive laws in favour of a suprahuman
law of movement. These 5uprahuman laws are established only when
human beings become the actual principle of the law, when "mankind itself
[becomes} the embodiment of the law."20
As opposed to the stabilizing purpose of positive laws, the totalitarian
notion of laws of Nature or History evokes pure laws of movement
disrupting the political interaction of transiency and stability. Totalitarian
"stability," so-called. is nothing other than. first. the complete homogeneity
and loyalty of the masSF;S and. second, the sense of security that the mass man
gains from the singular direction of the law of nature/history. However.
while the movement of the law of nature (not to be confused with the
movement of nature which is cyclical) can be considered stable in terms of its
overall unilinear direction, when considered in the present tense, "between
past and future," such a movement only means the unending restlessness of
a political movement based on unceasing expansion. And the law of nature
can only mean the continual striving for power that exists purely as the
incentive to push for increasingly more power. "If it is the law of nature to
eliminate everything that is harmful and wtfit to live, it would mean the end
of nature itself if new categories of the harmful and wtfit~to-livecould not be
found... In other words, the law of killing by which totalitarian movements
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seize and exercise power would remain a law of the movement even if they
ever succeeded in making all of humanity subject to their rule."21 Terror
assures the free movement of nature and history and becomes the realization
of the acting law of movement by preventing human opposition and
spontaneous action: totalitarianism "destroys the one essential prerequisite of
all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist
without space."22 In the destruction of this space, a space initially sustained by
the nation·state's positive laws, totalitarianism gains the life force of its
movement, the driving force of its law of motion. [t substitutes the freedom
of motion of individual actions for the bondage of a single motion carried
through by the automatic behaviour of an atomized mass. "Terror is the
realization of the law of movement; its chief aim is to make possible for the
force of nature or of history to race freely through mankind, unhindered by
any spontaneous human action. As such, terror seeks to 'stabilize' men in
order to liberate the forces of nature or history."23
Whereas Arendt shows terror to be the realization of the totalitarian
law of movement, she claims the logic of such a movement to yield an
"ideology." An ideology has a specific meaning for Arendt; it is something
which claims to "possess either the key to history, or the solution of all the
'riddles of the universe,' or the intimate knowledge of the hidden universal
laws which are supposed to rule nature and man."24 Ideologies, purporting to
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hold this "key of history," always understand by this "key" a single, solitary
idea. The "ideology" is the logic of a sole idea in an ever-extending history,
the logic of tlfe sole idea of History, and, as such, explains or predetermines
the explanation of future events as generated by this key: "ideologies have the
tendency to explain not what is, but what becomes, what is born and passes
away. They are in all cases concerned solely with the element of motion, that
is, with history in the customary sense of the word."25 History is the
explanation of the stream or current of events which is "the unfolding of a
process.. in constant change."26 Ideologies follow the same logic of
progression in which all individual actions and interests become a part of the
eternal movement of "process." All happenings are interpreted as the only
possible logical outcome of the singular idea of History_ Such a logic ensures
that nothing new or extraordinary occurs because all occurrences are the
inevitable outcome of this singular idea.
This monolithic, self-generating logic grounds itself in an idea and sets
before it a path that cannot be seen as anything other than the natural,
unavoidable result of its claim. In totalitarianism, the inherent movement of
the ideology overtakes the content of the idea: "what distinguished these new
totalitarian ideologists from their predecessors was that it was no longer
primarily the 'idea' of the ideology-the struggle of classes and the exploitation
of the workers or the struggle of the races and the care for Germanic peoples-
77
which appealed to them, but the logical process which could be developed
from it."27 Totalitarianism destroys all content for the logic of the movement
of process; totalitarianism's ultimate, most profound. and radically new
principle of politics is movement. Politics becomes the movement of a logical
deduction safeguarded by total tenor; terror arid ideology "correspond to each
other and need each other in order to set the terror-ruled movement in
motion and keep it moving."28
For Arendt, the political action required to found a body politic and
preserve its founding principles ought to stabilize the transiency of political
life. In contrast,. laws of movement. seen as definitive of totalitarian regimes,
perpetuate a progressing, unstoppable movement that does not serve as a
means for any particular end-for example, a free and stable body politic-but
sees movement as an end in itself. Totalitarian regimes utilize the principles
of the life-process to inculcate a necessary and inescapable law of movement
into the hearts and minds of an homogenized mass. Beginning with a single
premise (understood as the sole key to History or the universe), unfolding
necessarily in a predestined direction,. totalitarian movements irresistibly
drive forward unilinearly without end because they know no other reality
than the very motion of their principle's logic. Totalitarianism is a fonn of
rule based essentially on movement:. on a type of movement characterized by
the invasion of politics by the driving force of necessity. While the "process"
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is grounded in the attributes of circular movement-necessity, irresistibility.
regularity. never-ending change-it unfolds into an unending chain of
unilinear. infinite progression. Adopting only the character of circular
movement, "process" manifests itself unilinearly like a horse wearing
blinkers, blinded by the light of an oncoming train, racing toward inevitable
caUision and death.
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CHAPTER 4
Revolution, Novelty, and the Permanent Body Politic
Earlier I showed how Arendt interpreted the birth of Christ as a
momentous event: an event which challenged the pre-Christian notion of
regular, natural movement. And I have just shown in the previous chapter
how Arendt's first major political study led her to evaluate totalitarianism in
terms of movement: the movement of unilinear process. Revolution, our
subject now, marks an utterly new beginning, comparable to the birth of
Christ, but this time the beginning refers to the social and political world. In
addition to rupturing the cyclical recurrence of the secular world, revolutions
employ the novelty of political action in the service of establishing and
maintaining a new body politic. In other words, political action, here, does
not just manifest the freedom inherent in each individual's ability to begin
things anew, but builds and maintains structures and institutions to
guarantee and perpetuate this freedom. Political action builds a lasting public
realm. This chapter will deal with the importance of foundation for Arendt's
valuation of movement and how she conceptualizes the movement of a
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"permanent" body politic.
According to Arendt, two major phenomena have shaped the political
landscape of the twentieth century: war and revolution.l War has always
been a part of politics; but revol~tion, a categorically distinct form of violent
political conflict, only developed in the modem age. While "the aim of
revolution was, and always has been, freedom," war was fought primarily for
reasons of "conquest, expansion, defence of vested interests, conservation of
power in view of the rise of new and threatening powers, or support of a
given power equilibrium."2 However, there are four reasons for thinking that
war is moving towards its eclipse. First, the technological potential of "total
war" has caused a "perversion in the relationship between state and army"
where the conventional military distinction between soldiers and civilians
has disappeared and confounded the army's duty to protect its country's
citizens.3 Second, "wars have become politically... a matter of life and death"
such that it is commonly accepted that any government or state defeated in
war will perish.4 Third, war is becoming less a matter of physical battle than
of deterring an impending battle, a battle that has grown impossible through
the development of nuclear weaponry.s And, finally, "the interrelationship
of war and revolution... has steadily grown, and .. the emphasis in the
relationship has shifted more and more from war to revolution."6
While wars tend to bring about revolutions and revolutions tend to
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precipitate wars, neither war nor revolution have any bearing on politics
unless their violence is utilized toward the foundation or reestablisrunent of
a political realm: "only where change occurs in the sense of a new begiruting,
where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of
government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the
liberation from oppression aims at least at the constitution of freedom can we
speak of revolution."7 For Arendt, the hypothetical, violent, and speechless
siruation of a "state of nature" constructed by seventeenth-century theorists,
dramatized the beginning needed to move from prepolitical conflict to
politics: it implied "the existence of a beginning that is separated from
everything following it as though by an unbridgeable chasm.us It was typical
in the seventeenth century (a time of many wars and, significantly, the time
when revolutions began to appear) for the idea of new beginnings and
founding contracts to be contrasted with a "state of nature" because
"revolutions are the only political events which confront us directly and
inevitably with the problem of beginning."9 This beginning ruptures the
continuum of time and history by inserting an event marked by violence and
claiming to represent something entirely new.
Revolutions, as opposed to wars, are important to Arendt because they
suggest the new and unprecedented and are the political counterpart to the
principle of natality. In so being.. they alter radically the natural movement of
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the world by inserting a truly human movement. the artificial movement of
politics. Revolutions "are not mere changes," they are not modelled upon
"Plato's _. quasi-natural transformation of one form of government into
another. or... Polybius's ... appointed recurring cycle into which human affairs
are bound by reason of their always being driven to extremes."lO For "mere
change" is natural, inevitable, predetermined, and cyclical. As we saw in
Arendt's reading of Saint Augustine, it was the development of Christianity
that broke late antiquity's cyclical understanding of time by deriving a new
conception of temporal movement from the birth of Christ. Time ruptured by
the novelty of an unparalleled event was represented by rectilinear
movement, for the unprecedented can only arise from a rectilinear
conception of time: "It is obvious that only under the conditions of a
rectilinear time concept are such phenomena as novelty, uniqueness of
events, and the like conceivable at all."l1
However, for Christianity the secular world continued to revolve
without meaning. Only individual Christians "in possession of an
everlasting life, could break. through this cycle of everlasting change." l2 In
other words, a rectilinear conception of time only arises for the Christian who
has rejected the world and turned to God, his ultimate origin and beginning:
"Since man can know, be conscious of, and remember his origin. he is able to
act as a beginner and enact the (rectilinear) story of mankind."13 Revolution.,
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on the other hand. breaks the cycle of endless, meaningless change in the
social and political world: "the modem concept of revolution. inextricably
bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew,
that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before. is about to
unfold, was unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the
eighteenth century."14 Novelty. then, the introduction of entirely
unprecedented phenomenon into an inchoate world, breaks the endless
cyclical movement of interchangeable events and rearranges the conceptions
of history, nature, and time rectilinearly. It is precisely the idea of rectilinear
movement which is capable of imputing differentiation and meaning,
significance and purpose, to an otherwise meaningless, cyclical world.
As the novelty of Christ broke the cosmological cycle of the nahrral
world order, the novelty of the New World--of an America that had
"discovered the means to abolish that abject misery of sheer want." -broke the
natural cycle of the social order and unleashed, what Arendt calls, the "social
question." Traced back to Aristotle, the social question recognized "the
connection between wealth and government in any given country" and
prompted the insight that "forms of government are intercoIUlected with the
distribution of wealth, the suspicion that political power may simply follow
economic power, and, finally, the conclusion that interest may be the moving
force in all political strife."15 But until Europe got word of American
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abundance, all the social question did was recognize these connections
because "the ancient cycle of sempitemal recurrences had been based upon an
assumedly 'natural' distinction of rich and poor"16 that could change and
alter but only in accordance with the nahrral, predestined law of circular
historical change. What the influence of New World prosperity did. was to
"[break] this cycle once and for all" by showing that poverty was not natural
and eternal but accidental and subject to the manipulation of men. Perhaps
"life on earth [isl blessed with abundance instead of being cursed with
scarcity"17 and perhaps scarcity is not the natural outcome of society but a
concerted effort on the part of the rich to maintain its position at the expense
of the poor. These new perceptions fuelled a revolutionary spirit that fought
to liberate the masses from their social situation. Consequently, it was to the
detriment of most revolutions that "it appeared to revolutionary men more
important to change the fabric of society .. than to change the structure of the
political realm."18
The defining characteristic of revolution is that it has freedom as its
goal or purpose. However, Arendt notes that modem revolutions are quite
clearly caught up in the pursuit of both freedom and liberation and these
aspirations are not identical: "it may be a truism to say that liberation and
freedom are not the same; that liberation may be the condition of freedom but
by no means leads automatically to it; that the notion of liberty implied in
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liberation can only be negative, and hence, that even the intention of
liberating is not identical with the desire for freedom."19 Liberation. as Arendt
notes, is primarily a notion of negative freedom-generally understood as
freedom from interference or oppressive restraint-enabling individuals to
exercise particular activities or pursue a particular mode of life. Negative
freedom is, she explains, "freedom of movement," what Blackstone called
"the power of locomotion" and considered "the most important of all civil
rights."20 Where the social question and the possible liberation of the
oppressed were concerned, the obstruction of personal preference became
extended to suggest the suppression of intrinsic and essential freedoms,
"rights" that the wealthy deny the poor: "not 'Ufe, liberty, and property' as
such, but their being inalienable rights of man, was the result of
revolution."21 But this "right" of freedom for Arendt is not political freedom
per se, and therefore not the freedom that she claims to be the distinctive aim
of revolutions. Freedom the "right" is "the more or less free range of non-
political activities which a given body politic will permit and guarantee to
those who constitute it."22 The freedom of liberation is a private freedom,
not a public one, and therefore is not the political freedom Arendt prizes and
wants protected, because "the desire to be free from oppression, could have
been fulfilled under monarchical ... rulership" but not the desire to be free to
engage as equals in public discussion.23
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Political freedom, envisaged as public participation and achieved only
within an artificially constructed political space, first arose in the Greek polis
where "citizens lived together under conditions of no-rule, without a
division benveen rulers and ruJed."24 Freedom needs a created space where
individuals meet on equal tenns as citizens, freely to initiate words and deeds
that "could appear and be real only when others saw them, judged them,
remembered them." The political form of "no-rule," or isonomy,
characteristic of the polis is entirely different from democracy which rules by
majority and thereby overrules the minority's political freedom, the freedom
that requires active involvement in public not private life. Isonomy
guaranteed freedom and demanded equality.. making the two coexistent and
mutually supporting: "hence, equality, which we... frequently see as a danger
to freedom, was originally almost identical with it."25 Equality consisted of,
those who form a body of peers. Isonomy guaranteed... equality, but not
because all men were born or created equal, but... because men were by
nature not equal, and needed an artificial instirution, the polis, which ..
would make them equal. Equality existed only in this specifically
political realm, where men met one another as citizens and not as
private citizens. The difference between this ancient concept of equality
and our notion that men are born or created equal and become unequal
by virtue of social and political, that is man-made, instirutions can
hardly be over-emphasized.26
Inequality and binding necessity are not worldly, they are part of the human
condition; only equality and freedom require the concerted efforts of men and
their associations. Freedom and equality require the security of citizenship, as
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the case of European Jewry proved to the world.
The idea of novelty that came to pervade the eighteenth century view
of revolution, was, interestingly, initially muted and even contradicted the
early aspiration: "to revolve back to old times when things had been as they
ought to be."27 This is understandable because the word "revolution," an old
astronomical term, was used to designate "the regular, lawfully revolving
motion of the stars, which, since it was known to be beyond the influence of
man and hence irresistible, was certainly characterized neither by newness
nor by violence."28 Arendt claims that when the astronomical definition was
used to explain the human world it was used purely metaphorically to
impose a continual, inevitable cyclical order upon a world that would
otherwise be seen to move in an indiscriminate and chaotic manner. When
revolution first entered the political scene in the mid- to late seventeenth
century, govemments were overthrown with the purpose of restoring
previous forms of rule. Revolution "was used for a movement of revolving
back to some pre-established point and, by implication, of swinging back into
a preordained order."29 This conservative idea of revolutions even initially
preoccupied the minds of those who led the French and American
revolutions--the two revolutions that, according to Arendt, brought the
authentic political meaning of revolution to the fore, independent of the
social question and its desire for liberation. "It was only in the course of the
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eighteenth-century revolutions that men began to be aware that a new
beginning could be a political phenomenon.. that it could be the result of what
men had done and what they could consciously set out to do."JO
On a world that seemed to move haphazardly, the ancients imposed an
explanation of never-ending circularity based upon the regular movement of
the heavens. But when the word "revolution'" was first used with its new
emphasis on novelty (as opposed to restoration) it carried with it also the
strong connotation of irresistibility: "for the first time perhaps. the emphasis
has shifted from the (awfulness of a rotating, cyclical movement to its
irresistibility... The motion is still seen in the image of the movement of the
stars. but what is stressed now is that it is beyond human power to arrest it.
and hence it is a law unto itself.... 31 "Revolution" was employed in 1789 in
Paris to describe the surge of the masses, the poor and oppressed; people who
had previously remained in the "darkness" of their private world had
sudden!y broken into the open public space demanding their share of
prosperity. Into this space offering freedom and equality streamed poverty-
stricken masses who knew nothing of freedom but were. rather. driven by the
necessity of their unceasing bodily needs and the desire to be liberated from
them. Because the multitude knew nothing of public freedom. the French
revolution continued relentlessly from revolutionary action to counter-
revolutionary action: "the mighty CUITef\t of the revolution... was constantly
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accelerated by the 'crimes of tyranny', on one side, by the 'progress of liberty',
on the other, which inevitably provoked each other, so that movement and
counter~movementneither balanced nor checked or arrested each other, but
in a mysterious way seemed to add up to one stream of 'progressing violence',
flowing in the same direction with an ever-increasing rapidity."]2
The French Revolution became an arena of biological necessity
understood and theorized in terms of an historical inevitability that, since the
Revolution, has been understood as "a continuation of the movement
originally started in 1789."33 The idea of historical necessity, or historical
inevitability, was elaborated particularly by Hegel as he reflected on the events
of the French Revolution. Hegel's dialectical movement, the movement of
negation, is a circular movement gradually realizing the goal of freedom. But
as soon as one attempts to define or establish freedom, the necessary
movement of negation begins again so that the process of striving for
freedom becomes perpetual circular movement stretching out indefinitely in
rectilinear time. Cyclical movement superimposes itself upon the rectilinear
movement of time. The movement of History is, then, conceived of as
cyclical at its base, operating from the principle of necessity. However, when
carried along as a world story, as an event caught within and played according
to the rectilinear movement of time, it becomes the unilinear movement of
process.
90
The modem concept of history, with its unparalleled emphasis on
history as process, has many origins and among them especially the
earlier modem concept of nature as a process. As tong as men took
ll-teir cue from the natural sciences and thought of this process as a
primarily cyclical, rotating, ever-recurring movement ... it was
unavoidable that necessity should be inherent in historical as it is in
astronomical motion. Every cyclical movement is a necessary
movement by definition. But the fact that necessity as an inherent
characteristic of history should survive the modem break in the cycle
of eternal recurrences and make its reappearance in a movement that
was essentially rectilinear and hence did not revolve back to what was
known before but stretched out into an unknown future, this fact owes
its existence not to theoretical speculation but to political experience
and the course of real events.34
Arendt's explanation of the metaphorical manner in which spectators and
participants of the French Revolution viewed their historical process
concentrates entirely on metaphors of movement. The reader is reminded at
times that these are merely metaphors, but it is also quite dear, as seen above,
that these metaphors had real effects and that they were based on actual
experiences and events. The unilinear movement of process-the canflation
of cyclical necessity and rectilinear time--owed "its existence not to a
theoretical speculation [i.e. metaphOrical fiction] but to political experience
and the course of real events." At its root, Arendt sees the development of the
notion of historical necessity in terms of the biological condition of humans:
"behind the appearances [the metaphors) was a reality, and this reality was
bi.ological and not historical, though it appeared now perhaps for the first
time in the full light of history."35 This reality which had political and
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historical ramifications was the reality of the life process-the circular and
repetitive, automatic and irresistible, movement that is not metaphoric but
genuine and tangible, and "permeates our bodies and keeps them in a
constant state of change'"-that directed the masses as they stormed Paris in
"the image of one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible
'general will'."36
"Misery and want" characterized the reality of the poor in France who
defined their freedom in terms of necessity (an obvious contradiction of
principles) and came up with the pursuit of happiness, of abundance. The
success of the American Revolution.. on the other hand, was not so much the
result of a complete absence of poverty, but the lack of pervasive misery and
want. The result in America was not a "social question" but a political one
that concerned itself with more than banishing the "darkness" of poverty. In
France, this "darkness" prompted compassion. Compassion, considered "the
supreme political passion and... highest political virtue," became the "driving
force of the revolutionaries" allowing them to relate to Ie peuple and derive
from them a general will.37 But compassion.. Arendt argues, can only rel2.te to
an individual, particular situation and is incapable of comprehending the
plight and general will of a group of people. Only solidarity, a faculty of
reason rather than a passion of the heart can institute "a community of
interest with the oppressed and exploited" because solidarity which "partakes
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of reason, and hence of generality, is able to comprehend a multitude
conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation or a people, but
eventually all mankind."38
The course of the French Revolution. influenced by the valorization of
compassion for the poor, socialized the political realm and fought for
liberation the only way a people ruled by necessity could know how, with
prepolitical violence. As the revolution deteriorated into violent tyranny, it
also degenerated into war. The suffering of the poor which had lasted for
centuries was unleashed as rage and frustration. Yet this violent release did
not free the poor, it merely perpetuated their enslavement to necessity
because necessity feeds the rage of the hungry, what Francis Bacon called the
"rebellions of the belly."39 Hunger urged the poor inexorably toward their
biology, rather than toward a polity of freedom and equality. The Declaration
of the Rights of Man, drawn up in the course of the French Revolution. was
meant to establish and found the principles upon which the polity would be
constituted. These were, however, "the rights of life and nature rather than
the rights of freedom and citizenship;"40 they were determined by needs and
wants, not guiding principles or constitutional ingredients necessary to secure
political action. "The new body politic was supposed to rest upon man's
natural rights, upon his rights in so far as he is nothing but a natural being,
upon his right to 'food, dress, and the reproduction of the species', that is
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upon his right to the necessities of life."H And even if these "Rights of Man"
could not artificially guarantee the downtrodden's necessities, the irresistible
movement of the revolution, "[would) surely, in the words of Rousseau, ..
'force men to be free'."42
Revolutions always arise in times when ruling bodies are in the
process of deterioration; which is not to say that the ruination of
governments occurs because of revolutions. Only when governing bodies
have begun to break down and people with common goals collaborate with
the objective of contracting a new state of political affairs, does the
opportunity of revolution arise. Revolutionary action requires the realization
of two major tasks if it is to triumph: first, the foundation or constitution of a
new polity and, second, the perseverance and extension of the revolutionary
spirit and motivating prinCiples responsible for the act of political
constitution.43 The French Revolution did not succeed in establishing a
republic based on political freedom and was motivated more by an
"intoxication"," of passions and sentiments than ideas and principles. The
American Revolution, on the other hand, was successful-at Least in founding
a new body politic-because its leaders "knew very well ... that the people went
to the town assemblies... neither exclusively because of duty nor, and even
less, to serve their own interests but most of all because they enjoyed the
discussions, the deliberations, and the making of decisions."45 For the
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Americans, happiness was public freedom, not, as we saw in the work of
Augustine, a reclusive, unworldly freedom attained within the
contemplative confines of the inner self.
Unlike the short life of the first French constitution drafted in 1791 that
developed into "an avalanche of constitutions," the American constitution
remains today the prized foundation of the United States of America and the
archetype of a successful revolutionary "beginning."46 Yet, America. too, fell
short of its revolutionary striving by failing to maintain and continue the
spirit of public happiness and public freedom. The Americans proved
ultimately to be no less susceptible to interests of private affairs and freedom,
as the significance of the founding shifted "from a share in public affairs for
the sake of public happiness to a guarantee that the pursuit of private
happiness would be protected and furthered by public power."47 After the
constitution of the republic, it was expected that the private pursuit of
prosperity be protected by the political realm, a political realm that citizens no
longer wanted to participate in, but needed to guarantee their civil rights. The
social question also affected America: "Since the country was never
overwhelmed by poverty, it was 'the fatal passion for sudden riches' rather
than necessity that stood in the way of the founders of the republic.".S For
Arendt, the problem today remains one of inconsistency between the dreams
of the American Revolution and the American dream, between the dream of
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public. political freedom and "the dream of a 'promised land' where milk and
honey flOW."49
While both the French and American Revolutions began hoping to
reestablish or revolve back to a previous political state, the French ended up
producing a perpetual and permanent situation of revolution while the
Americans, upon the cessation of the revolution, developed a constitution-
based form of limited government. Separating the American from the French
Revolution was an act of foundation or constitution that endured and
thereby founded a lasting body politic. Arendt notes that "constitution"
implies both "the act of constituting as well as the law or rules of government
that are 'constituted' ."50 Important for both revolutions was that their
constitutions were not administered by a governing body. but that the people
themselves had been directly involved in the process of constituting their
new polity's guiding principles. "Hence the need in France as in America for
constituent assemblies and special conventions whose sole task it was to draft
a constitution; hence also the need to bring the draft home and back to the
people and have the Articles of Confederacy debated, clause by clause, in the
town-hall meetings and, later, the articles of the Constitution in the state
congresses."51
One sees in the American constitution the effort to prevent leaders
from Wielding unlimited power and also the desire to keep the majority from
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imposing its interests against the minorities. Yet the constitution-makers had
recognized that to safeguard the American people from such abuses of power,
they had to endow these people with power, that only power can resist power.
and that this power coexisted with political freedom. "Power can be stopped
and still be kept intact only by power, so that the principle of the separation of
power not only provides a guarantee against the monopolization of power by
one part of the goverrunent, but actually provides a kind of mechanism, built
into the very heart of government. through which new power is constant!y
generated, without, however, being able to overgrow and expand to the
detriment of other centres or sources of power."52 Power must be shared and
enacted amongst a plurality and arises only when this plurality compacts
together to establish a common political realm. "Hence, binding and
promising, combining and covenanting are the means by which power is kept
in existence; where and when men succeed in keeping intact the power which
sprang up between them during the course of any particular act or deed, they
are already in the process of foundation. of constituting a stable worldly
structure to house, as it were, their combined power of action."S3 The
revolution's spirit emerged and established itself only through the continued
"cosociation" of citizens acting in the public realm, because, in the process,
they recreated the action of constitution and of promising.
In contrast, "The great and fateful misfortune of the French
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Revolution was that none of the constituent assemblies could command
enough authority to lay down the law of the land; ... they lacked the power to
constitute by definition; they themselves were unconstitutional."54 What is
more, Arendt points out that the French revolutionaries ardently believed
that power and law originated out of a single source. The problem for the
revolutions, then. was the problem of authority, of authorizing the legal code
and the power-executing bodies. This problem was greatly complicated
because the model of authority in the governments replaced by revolution
was absolute. Rooted in the eternal and transcendent authority of the Church,
absolute authority took the form of absolute monarchies, embodied by the
"divine right of kings," even when the secular realm emancipated itself from
the Church. Obviously not "divine," absolute monarchies degenerated into
tyrannies and when revolutions arose, the problem of authority arose with
them. While France had to contend with the absolute rule of the anciens
regimes, America had to deal with only a "limited monarchy." The result was
truly revolutionary, for the Americans compacted together to discover "an
entirely new concept of power and authority."ss "Those who received the
power to constitute, to frame constitutions, were duly elected delegates of
constituted bodies; they received their authority from below, and when they
held fast to the Roman principle that the seat of power lay in the people, they
did not think in terms of a fiction and an absolute, the nation above all
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authority and absolved from all laws, but in terms of a working reality, the
organized multitude whose power was exerted in accordance with laws and
limited by them."~
Cndispensable for the success of the American Revolution was the act
of foundation. The Founding Fathers of the revolution had sought to
emulate Rome's model of authority derived from concrete institutions Like
the Roman Senate. But, there existed a marked difference: "In Rome, the
function of authority was political, and it consisted in giving advice. while in
the American republic the function of authority is legal, and it consists in
interpretation."57 The Roman Senate, the seat of political advice and
governance, represented the tradition of Roman authority emanating out of
the very foundation, the very beginning, of the Roman republic. The Senate
embodied the principium, the beginning of Rome, and, at the same time, was
authorized to adapt the Roman republic to the changing times:
For auctoritas, whose etymological root is augere, to augment and
increase, depended upon the vitality of the spirit of foundation, by
virtue of which it was possible to augment, to increase and enlarge, the
foundations as they had been laid down by the ancestors. The
uninterrupted continuity of this augmentation and its inherent
authority could come about only through tradition, that is, through the
handing down, through an unbroken line of successors, of the
principle established in the beginning. To stay in this unbroken line of
successors meant in Rome to be in authority, and to remain tied back to
the beginning of the ancestors in pious remembrance and conservation
meant to have Roman pietas, to be 'religiOUS' or 'bound back' to one's
own beginnings.s8
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A reverent allegiance to the act that founded the Roman republic prOVided
the authority necessary to guide future affairs; authority, the act of
augmentation in aid of the continuation of public freedom. was tradition. It
was noted earlier, however, that America's authority was legal and based in
the American Constitution. rather than deriving from a senate that grants
political advice. But, for Arendt this does not change the fundamental fact
that America's almost fanatical worship of the Constitution can be
understood to have as much, if not more, to do with the worship of the act of
constitution as with the actual document and its literal laws. In other words. a
body like the Supreme Court is constantly referring back to the very
foundation of the American republic and its job of interpretation deals
precisely with the need to augment the Constitution and perpetuate the body
politic: "one is tempted to conclude that the remembrance of the event itself-
a people deliberately founding a new body politic - has continued to shroud
the actual outcome of this act, the document itself, in an abnosphere of
reverent awe which has shielded both event and document against the
onslaught of time and changed circumstances."S9
Political natality, the revolutionary beginning of republics, the act of
founding something entirely new, broke the cycle of the world's meaningless
change. But while it can only be understood within a rectilinear time concept-
-a beginning that nourishes and protects the existence of a body politic which
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both extends forward and refers back-it is by no means bound to one itself.
Not only is [the beginning] not bound into a reliable chain of cause and
effect. a chain in which each effect immediately turns into the cause for
future developments, the beginning has, as it were, nothing
whatsoever to hold on to; it is as though it came out of nowhere in
either time or space. For a moment,. the moment of beginning, it is as
though the beginner had abolished the sequence of temporality itself,
or as though the actors were thrown out of the temporal order and its
continuity. _,_ In other words, the problem of beginning is solved
through the introduction of a beginner whose own beginnings are no
longer subject to question because he is 'from eternity to eternity'. This
eternity is the absolute of temporality, and to the extent that the
beginning of the universe reaches back into this region of the absolute,
it is no longer arbitrary but rooted in something which, though it may
be beyond the reasoning capacities of man, possesses a reason, a
rationale of its own.60
Foundation, then, provides the absolute authority lost through the
secularization of the political world. The movement of beginning is
important because in a sense it is a non-movement, standing outside the
contingency and instability of moving time and stabilizes the political affairs
of men. Foundation as tradition provides continuity to the process of
augmentation, to the process of movement, necessary to the rectilinear
development and continuation of the republic; and foundation as beginning
brings movement to rest securing the republic's absolute authority.
To sum up: It was revolution, ironically, emerging authentically in the
American and French Revolutions, that broke the cycle of eternal return, and,
even then, only the American Revolution succeeded in constituting a body
politic secure in the act of foundation. The novelty of foundation enacts the
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beginning of a political union that. ideally, could last indefinitely, working to
maintain the principle of freedom through an unpredictable future. The ideal
body politic is stable and durable. enacting the "timeless now'" Augustine
prized. As the world continues to change and alter, it is the responsibility of
the acting political realm to stabilize these fluctuating movements by
referring back. to the polity's founding principles and then. from the present.
employing the tradition's guiding precepts to navigate into the future. While
individual political actions take the form of undetermined rectilinearity
adapting and augmenting as time continues, the body politic adopts the image
of permanence, the eternal, stabilizing the flux of time.
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CHAPTERS
Adolph Eichmann:
"The 'Master' Who Knew How to Make People Move"
If the defendant excuses himself on the ground that he acted not as a
man but as a mere functionary whose functions could just as easHy
have been carried out by anyone else. it is as if a criminal pointed to the
statistics on crime-which set forth that so-and-so many crimes per day
are committed in such-and-such a place-and declared that he on!y did
what was statistically expected. that it was mere accident that he did it
and not somebody else, since after all somebody had to do it.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem
Arendt researched and wrote On Revolution during the mid to late
1950'5, but the book was not published until 1963. This was partly because
Arendt reported the hial of Adolph Eichmann, an ex-Nazi lieutenant colonel,
for the New Yorker in 1961 and 1962. Arendt's report on the trial, Eichmann
in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, also published in 1963, created
world-wide public outcry from Jewish communities. Arendt not only
criticized the process of the trial, but portrayed European Jews actively
cooperating in their own slaughter. But this was a trial, not a history of the
Jewish people or a study of totalitarianism, and therefore, Arendt argued,
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only Eichmann's deeds could be considered pertinent to the case. Arendt
concluded that Eichmann had been unable to think and thereby unable to
judge his actions. Eichmann's evil acts were not vindictive or malicious but
banal. This chapter seeks to explore Arendt's reactions to the Eichmann trial
and connect it to her final work.. The Life of the Mind, where she attempted to
link. thought with action and resolve the "fact" that confronted her during
the trial: Eichmann's thoughtlessness. In this way, Arendt's book on
Eichmann provides a bridge from her political theory to her later theory of
the mind.
In the Postscript to Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality
of Evil,l Arendt claims emphatically that her book is just a "trial report" and
that its objective is to show "the extent to which the court in Jerusalem
succeeded in fulfilling the demands of justice."2 On trial is (Otto) Adolf
Eichmann, a retired Nazi lieutenant colonel, who had been kidnapped from
Argentina on May 11, 1960 by the Israeli Secret Service and brought back to
Jerusalem to stand trial on April 11, 1961.3 Arendt claims that if one is to
judge Eichmann according to the dictates of justice, one must remember that
his actions-and only his actions-are on trial. Yet the prosecution built their
case "on what the Jews had suffered, not on what Eichmann had done" and
the defense merely allowed the prosecution to wander "no matter how
irrelevant and immaterial" its testimony.4 This was, Arendt decides, no
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ordinary mal, for the facts had not been presented or debated propedy;
moreover, many facts were ignored altogether. By including omitted facts and
by discarding the theatrical qualities and "general picture drawing"
superfluous to the judgement of actions, Arendt seeks to expose the problems
of the Eichmann maL
However, it becomes quite clear (as much as Arendt wants us to believe
her work is "simple l'eporting") that Eichmann in Jerusalem is about more
than the mere evidence of the case. A high!Y moralistic book. it continually
points out lessons on political responsibility, outlines the nature and purpose
of justice, and provides the opportunity for Arendt's own judgement of
Eichmann. Lurking behind Arendt the journalist, is Arendt the judge.
Shortly after the war, Eichmann was caught and put in a camp for 5.s.
officers. After unsuccessful attempts to discover his identity and because of
his name's frequent appearance at the Nuremberg Trials, Eichmann fled to
the southern outskirts of Hamburg and began work as a lumberjack under an
assumed name, "Otto Heninger."5 In 1950 he escaped to Buenos Aires,
Argentina, where many other ex·Nazis fled, and resided as "Ricardo
Klement."6 However, Eichmann did not try particularly hard to hide his
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identity and it was surprising. Arendt says, that the Israelis took quite so long
to find him. Eichmann knew Jews were snooping in his area and closing in
but. in his words, "simply let things catch up with [him]" and was soon after
captured by three Israelis.7 Eichmann wrote a statement consenting to a trial
in Israeli where he and his kidnappers arrived on May 22, 1960.
From the beginning, the Eichmann trial was problematic because the
prosecution. led by Attorney General Gideon Hausner, voiced the political
interests of David Ben-Gurian, Prime Minister of Israel. Mr. Ben-Gurion,
who planned Eichmann's kidnapping. was detennined to have a show trial
and was, Arendt argues, the "invisible stage manager of the proceedings."S
Despite the stage-like setup of the court house and the efforts of the
prosecution to show the world, its audience, the tragedy of Jewish history, the
Eichmann trial failed to become a drama. After a few weeks most of the
journalists left and, with them, world attention subsided. The three presiding
judges worked hard to consider only the evidence pertinent to Eichmann's
deeds and shunned publicity, for they knew weighing judgement was a
necessarily private affair. But. more than anything else, the "play aspect of the
trial .. coUapsed under the weight of the hair-raising atrocities."9
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, and Mr. Hausner too, hoped the trial
would become a potential mine for unearthing other NaZis-particularly
Nazis thought to be protected by Arab rulers. While no Nazis connected to
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the Arabs were uncovered, many others elsewhere were found. to But the
German courts that tried these and other Nazi criminals were remarkably
lenient, as Germany, under Chancellor Adenauer, had been by appointing
people with Nazi histories to prominent public positions. "True, if the
Adenauer administration had been too sensitive about employing officials
with a compromising Nazi past, there might have been no administration at
all"ll··for the Nazi machine was not a small group of directors, but
penetrated virtually every sector of German public life.
More problematic for Arendt was the trial's other, allegorical,
"purpose," to teach the world, both Jews and Gentiles, lessons: the lesson of
how the Nazis murdered millions of Jews, because they were Jews; the lesson
that it was not just Nazis, but the whole Gentile world that was responsible,
and should be ashamed, for thousands of years of Jewish persecution; and the
lesson that Israelis must not forget that their history is the history of the
Jewish people, a history inseparable from continual oppression.12 Based on a
history of hostile relations, Mr. Ben-Gurion wanted to reinforce the "us" and
"them" ideology of "Jewish consciousness." Yet "it was this conviction which
produced the dangerous inability of the Jews to distinguish between friend
and foe .. because they somehow thought that all Gentiles were alike."n The
prosecution wanted to indict history, not the real individual brought to
Jerusalem for trial, and quoted Haman's decree and Ezekiel as sources of
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Jewish contempt for lsrael's enemies. Arendt saw this as "bad history and
cheap rhetoric" but. worse than this, it distracted from judging the accused
the soLe purpose of the legal system. and could equally be interpreted to
vindicate Ec.hmann's actions. in other words, the implication could follow
that Eichmann was not responsible because Auschwitz was just the logical
conclusion of the predestined history of anti-Semitism. But History cannot be
prosecuted and defended in the courts, and History cannot be judged and
punished. Eichmann cannot pay for History. but can only pay for his
individual part in it,. for the actions that he had control over.
Iustice demands that the accused be prosecuted. defended and judged.
and that all other questions of seemingly greater import-of "how could
it happen?" and "Why did it happen?," of "Why the Jews?" and "Why
the Germans?:' of "What was the role of other nations?" and "What
was the extent of co-responsibility on the side of the Allies?," of "How
could the Jews through their own leaders cooperate in their own
destruction?" and "'Why did they go to their death like lambs to the
slaughter?"-be left in abeyance... On trial are his deeds, not the
sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind,. not even
anti-Semitism and racism.a
Adolf Eichmann, born March 19, 1906, in Solingen, Germany, was
neither a good student nor particularly successful in the job market.15 He did
not graduate from high school or an engineering program in vocational
school and relied on his family to secure much of his employment.
(Interestingly, one of Eichmann's jobs, as a travelling salesman for the
Austrian Vacuum Oil Company, was due to a Jewish relation and was
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"among his 'private reasons' for not hating Jews."16) Yet Eichmann always
had an explanation for the quick. changes in employment. explanations
indicative of a man prone to lying and bragging. Though born into a "solid
middle-class family," he was a "declasse son" who felt, and was treated as,
socially inferior throughout his life. 17 In April 1932 he was invited to join the
National Socialist Party (Nazi Party) and entered the 55.• or Scllultzslaffdn.
where he was promoted finally to Obusturmbannft1hrer, Lieutenant colonel.
"From a humdrum life without significance and consequence the wind had
blown him into History... into a Movement that always kept moving and in
which somebody like him-already a failure in the eyes of his social class, of
his family. and hence in his own eyes as well-could start from scratch and
still make a career.nl8 Eichmann.. as he was facing the court in Jerusalem.
"might still have preferred... to be hanged as Obersturmbannftihur a.D. (in
retirement) rather than [live) out his life quietly and normally as a traveling
salesman for the Vacuum Oil Company."19
It appeared that Eichmann was not fully aware of what he was getting
into when he joined the Nazis; "he did not even know the Party program. he
never read Mein Ko.mpf. H20 And when Eichmann joined the S.D., the
Sichtrheitsdienst or Security Service of the Reichsfiihrer 5.5 .• in 1934, he
found himself equally ignorant of this section of the regime's operations. 21
Eichmann had mistaken the S.D. for a more glamorous security service and
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was put. much to his dismay, into an lnfonnation department where he
controlled material about Freemasonry. A short time later he transferred to a
new department dealing solely with Jewish information. rn the late 1930's,
the S.D. merged with the "regular Security Police of the State" (which
included the Gestapo) to compose the R.5.H.A. (Reichssicllerheitsllauptamt
or Head Office for Reich Security)-one of twelve head offices of the 5.5.22
The R.S.H.A. was divided into seven sections with subsections further
divided into offices. Eichmann's first job with the RS.H.A. began in January
1940 in Bureau IV·O·4 (section [V, subsection 0, office 4), the Bureau of
Emigration and Evacuation.23 In March 1941 he was moved to Bureau IV-54,
"Jewish Affairs, Evacuation;' and in October of that year he was awarded his
final promotion to Obersturmbannfuhrer of this section. 2ol From Eichmann's
perspective, the chain of command began with Adolf Hitler and moved
through Heinrich Himmler (Reichsfilhrer 5.5. and Chief of the German
Police) to Reinhardt Heydrich (Chief of the R.5.H.A.) to Heinrich Muller
(Gruppenfilhrer, or major general, and Head of Bureau rv, the Bureau of the
Gestapo) to the head of lV-B (which turned out to be empty) to, finally,
Eichmann himself.25 The most important fact of the Nazi administrative
mayhem, besides perhaps serving as an explanation for Eichmann's
uncertainty about what he was entering, was that "all these organs, wielding
enormous power, were in fierce competition with one another-which was of
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no help to their victims, since their ambition was always the same: to kill as
many Jews as possible."26
In the early stages of the Nazi regime, policies of discrimination had
aimed at a broad section of the population, "primarily ... 'anti-Fascists'--
Communists, Socialists, left-wing intellectuals, and Jews in prominent places-
-[and) had not yet shifted entirely to persecution of the Jews qua Jews."21 The
first time the Nazis distinguished Jews from the rest of the German
population was in 1933 when they were excluded from the Civil Service,
most other public positions, and many universities. Jewish legal and medical
positions, on the other hand, slowly petered out, while Jewish business and
industry were not affected until 1938. The Nazi regime, slowly beginning to
deal with the "Jewish problem," issued the Nuremburg Laws in 1935
stripping Jews of their German citizenship: "The Nuremburg Laws had
deprived the Jews of their political but not of their civil rights; they were no
longer citizens (Reichsburger), but they remained members of the German
state (StaatsangehOrige). Even if they emigrated, they were not automatically
stateless."28 Jews were allowed to live, to exist, within the state of Germany,
but without the rights of German citizens. They were, though, encouraged to
leave by both Nazis and Zionists. Emigration soon became a popular
alternative and provided Jews with the possibility of leaving with most if not
all of their savings (as time went on, emigration became more difficult and
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Jews were prevented from taking money with them). Viewed. for a short time
as a solution to the "problem." the Nuremburg Laws even satisfied those Jews
willing to remain. "stabilizing" their position in the German state: "Now, the
Jews felt.. they had received laws of their own and would no longer be
outlawed. If they k.ept to themselves.. they would be able to live
unmolested. "29 Hence when Eichmann transferred to the new department
dealing entirely with the "Jewish question," he found "both Zionists and
Assimilationists [talkingI in terms of a great 'Jewish revival: a 'great
constructive movement of German Jewry,' and [still quarreling] among
themselves in ideological terms about the desirability of Jewish emigration, as
though this depended upon their own decisions."30
Eichmann was "fascinated" by the Jewish question (he went so far as to
read the "famous Zionist classic" Theodor Hew's Der Judenstaat and Adolf
Bohm's History of Zionism) and pointed out that he shared with the Zionists
an "idealism" and, because of this, "respected them {and] 'treated them as
equals: "31 Eichmann saw "idealists" as people who "live" for a single.
solitary ideal, who sacrifice their feelings and any other beliefs to secure a
paramount goal to which "everything and. especially. everybody" was to be
sacrificed.32 Jewish emigration was desired by both Nazis and Zionists and
they worked together to fulfil their compatible ideals. The Nazis adopted a
"pro-Zionist attitude" and worked with "emissaries from Palestine .. for the
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illegal immigration of Jews into British-ruled Palestine.")3 Eichmann argued,
"That solution I envisaged as putting firm soil under their feet so that they
would have a place of their own, soil of their own .. it was also the kind of
solution approved by movements among the Jewish people themselves, and
I regarded this as the most appropriate solution to the matter.").t
But when Eichmann moved to Vienna in March 1938, the ideal of
voluntary emigration suddenly became a policy of forced emigration to make
Germany judenrein, or clean of Jews. This systematic expulsion of Jews was
the first of three solutions35 to the Jewish question. The horrible thing was
that Eichmann viewed his actions as benevolent, helping the Jews work
toward what they themselves wanted. In retrospect, he also viewed his
actions as saving hundreds of thousands of Jews from an almost certain
death. To Arendt, this showed Eichmann's fundamental character flaw, "his
almost total inability ever to look at anything from the other fellow's point of
view."J6 And this character flaw manifested itself in Eichmann's inability to
express himself, his continual use of cliches, and bad memory: "the longer
one listened to him, the more obvious it became that his inability to speak.
was closely connected to his inability to think, namely, to think from the
standpoint of someone else."J7 It was precisely this inability to understand
what one was doing, that made Eichmann's evil banal; what Arendt called
"word and thought defying banality of Evil:'J8
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Zionists, meanwhile, were the only Jews able to negotiate, to speak..
with the Nazis during these years and they looked favourably upon the
possibility of reversing Jewish assimilation-"dissimilation"-as a "solution"
to the "problem."J9 Consequently when Zionists, negotiating to bring Jews
back to Palestine, chose only those Jews they thought appropriate or fitting-
prosperous businessmen, youth. intellectuals--the remaining majority of
German Jews "found themselves confronted with two enemies-the Nazi
authorities and the Jewish authorities."40
Vienna had been the "real beginning of [Eichmann's] career" and
initiated a series of four promotions between 1937 and 1941 including. in
October 1941, his last and most important post. Obersturmbannfiihrtr:H Early
in 1939 he unhappily left Vienna where everything ran Like clockwork to start
a new emigration post in Prague,. but by September war had been declared and
Eichmann returned to Berlin to become the head of the Reich Center for
Jewish Emigration.;/,2 By this time Poland and Rumania had just begun
expelling their Jews and Germany, a short time later, conquered Poland
leaving the Reich another two to two and a half million Jews.;/,) Jewish
emigration, as a "solution," became less and less plausible because, as
Germany conquered more nations, the "Jewish problem" increased through
the acquisition of foreign Jews.
After Eichmann's success in Vienna, he was considered an expert on
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the "Jewish question" and, what is most important, "an 'authority' on
emigration and evacuation.".w But emigration was now impossible and if
Eichmann wanted to keep his job, it would be important to figure out how he
would fit into a new "solution." Still working toward "putting finn soil
under their feet" and toward making the Reich judenrein, Eichmann decided
to force Poles out of the Russian-controlled General Government area of
Poland (Poland was separated during the Nazi invasion) by moving Jews
from Reich~controlled, western Poland into this General Government area.
This was the "idea of Nisko," developed by Eichmann and Dr. Franz
Stahlecker (his superior in Vienna and Prague) but also ordered by Heydrich,
to "concentrate" Jews within a defined area of Poland. Eichmann saw this
second "solution to the Jewish question" as "the erection of an autonomous
Jewish state in the form of a protectorate."45 The Nazi authorities soon
became confident, however, that "nothing less than complete evacuation
from Europe would do."46 Yet this still required the concentration of Jews to
expedite their movement out of Europe and, important for Eichmann's
career, the movement of Jews into specific areas. While the content of the
"solution" had changed, Eichmann's job had changed little; he was put in
charge of Thereseinstadt, a ghetto in Bohemia, but his job still consisted
almost wholly of the transportation and delivery of Jews. Eichmann was, after
all, the 'master' who knew how to make people move,"47 and it was this
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control of movement that determined the effectiveness of the killing camps
in the East: "Eichmann's position was that of the most important conveyor
belt in the whole operation, because it was always up to him and his men
how many Jews could or should be transported from any given area, and it
was through his office that the ultimate destination of the shipment was
cleared, though that destination was not determined by him."-I8
Various final destinations were considered-Madagascar. places in
Canada and South America-hut the impracticality of this "solution" soon
became evident and the ghettos and concentration camps became either
extermination camps or bases from which to move Jews to extermination
camps. The third solution, officially and appropriately called the "Final
Solution:' was relayed to Eichmann in a personal interview with Heydrich in
September 1941: "Tile Fuhrer has ordered the physical ertermination of the
Jews."~9 Killing was the easiest and most assured way of dealing with the
"Jewish question." Eichmann, thinking back on this, said, "I now lost
everything, all joy in my work, all initiative, all interest; I was, so to speak.
blown out." But Eichmann's disappointment Arendt implies, had less to do
with upset over mass murder and more to do with the fact that Heydrich had
passed control of the "final solution" to the Head Office for Economy and
Administration and not to the R.S.H.A. where Eichmann worked. It must be
remembered that Eichmann's "greatest 'grief and sorrow,' [was that} he never
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advanced beyond the grade of 5.5. Obersturmbannfiihrer," and the Final
Solution had gotten in the way.so
Eichmann was declared "normar by half a dozen psychiatrists. had
never killed before and could not stand to see violence of any kind. and did
not hate Jews but treated with the greatest of respect and on occasion with
subservience, those he met. Why. then. was Eichmann not distraught about
the prospect of mass murder? Why was he, who had been brought up
believing with the rest of the German population "ThOll shalt not kilt"
willing to commit to a policy of genocide? "As Eichmann told it. the most
potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the simple fact that he
could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against the Final
50Iuo.oo."51 It was during the Wannsee Conference, where Ministers and
Civil Servants gathered to discuss the particulars of the Final Solution as
applied to the whole of Europe, that Eichmann first experienced an
unburdening of conscience. Here he "(saw) with his own eyes and [heardJ
with his own ears that not only Hitler, not only Heydrich or the 'sphinx'
Miiller, not just the 55. or the Party, but the ~te of the good old Civil Service
were vying and fighting with each other for the honor of taking the lead in
these 'bloody' matters. [Eichmann claims:) •At that moment, I sensed a kind of
Pontius Pilate feeling. for I felt free of all guilt: Who was he to judge? Who
was he 'to have [his) own thoughts in this matter'?"52 There was not. Arendt
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argues, a "single organization or public institution in Gennany" that had not
been involved criminally with the Nazi regime. businessmen, for example,
actively sought Jews for slave labour, setting up their businesses near
concentration camps.53
Yet for Arendt,. "the darkest dtapter of the whole dark story" was the
cooperation of the Jews, particularly the Jewish leaders. in their own
massacre, and was the "gravest omission" of the prosecution's politically
interested case. Wherever Eichmann endeavoured to round up Jews and
transport them to their deaths, he established Jewish Councils, composed
often of pr~Zionist Jewish leaders, who were made responsible for recording
people's names and property and collecting their money, distributing Yellow
Star badges, recording vacant property, organizing Jewish police to ensure
delivery of Jews to concentration camps, and imparting whatever Jewish
material remained to the Nazi authorities.54 "Wherever Jews Lived, there
were recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership. almost without
exception. cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with
the Nazis. The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really been
unorganised and leaderless, there would have been chaos and misery but the
total number of victims would hardly have been between four and six
million people."SS What is worse, Arendt claims, "they enjoyed their new
power." Within the camps, too, Jews were responsible for building gas
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chambers, the physical killing of Jews, and digging graves. And so Eichmann
did not feel any guilt because he saw no opposition; in fact, his job, in his eyes,
had been legitimated. Regardless of whether people were "inwardly opposed"
to the Final Solution, Eichmann, wherever he looked, "saw the zeal and
eagerness with which'good society' everywhere reacted as he did. He did not
need to 'close his ears to the voice of conscience: .. because his conscience
spoke with a 'respectable voi.ce: with the voice of respectable society around
him."56
There were, on the other hand, forms of resistance that confronted the
Nazis and that issued from within the Nazi regime. An anti-Hitler conspiracy
arose in July 1944 made up of ex-Nazis and high ranking officers of the Third
Reich. This rebellion, which Hitler crushed, was, however, perpetrated by
peopLe who foresaw Germany's defeat and ruin and thought Hitler to be
"criminal and a fool," rather than because of any concern over the Nazi
policies in the East. Another case of internal resistance arose when a
"moderate wing," backed by Himmler, in 1944 stopped obeying Hitler's orders
and began to slow the killings in the death camps.57 However, their reasons
were purely self-interested: first, they hoped that by proving they had killed
fewer Jews than they were capable they would be saved from the courts after
the war and, second, they began to see Jews in terms of dollars, selling them
for as much as possible to outside organizations hoping to save Jews. Again,
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internal resistance lacked authentic concern for Jewish lives and betrayed
Little. or no. moral understanding of the crimes that were being committed..
Arendt tells us thaI:,. in German-conquered nations, "where the Nazis
did not succeed in setting up a puppet government they also failed to enlist
the cooperation of the Jews" and subsequently encountered difficu.lties when
trying to deport them to killing centres.58 When countries deported Jews. they
tended. to begin deporting only "stateless" or foreign Jews and often ended
their deportations there. France, for example. was very willing to expel
foreign Jews, but when the Germans asked for native French Jews they
immediately refused and "started making such endless difficulties with
regard to the deportation of stateless and other foreign Jews that all the
ambitious plans for the evacuation of Jews from France did indeed have to be
dropped."S9 Citizenship became the deciding factor in the fate of many
European Jews; to lose one's citizenship meant one was automatically subject
to expulsion. To be stateless was to be without rights: ..the necessary
legislation fo[' making victims stateless... was important on two counts: it
made it impossible for any country to enquire into their fate, and it enabled
the state in which they were resident to confiscate their property."60 In
Germany, all German Jews who lived outside of Germany's borders
automatically lost their nationality, and tlle denaturalization of local Jews was
an absolutely essential prerequisite for tlleir extermination. Ironically, when
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Eichmann fled to Argentina he did not secure Argentinean citizenship; nor
would West Germany protect him as a citizen living abroad: "it was
Eichmann's de facto statelessness, and nothing else. that enabled the
Jerusalem court to sit in judgement on him. Eichmann though no legal
expert, should have been able to appreciate that,. for he knew from his own
career that one could do as one pleased only with stateless people."61
Denmark. however, used statelessness to its advantage when it refused
to deliver to the Nazis the denaturalized Jews that had left the Reich fo.
Denmark: since they were no longer German citizens, the Germans had no
right to demand their deportation. Denmark was, along with Norway, Italy,
Bulgaria, and Sweden.. one of the countries that refused to comply with the
Nazis' Final Solution. Croatia.. Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia.. Greece, and, most
notoriously, Rumania complied with the Nazi orders, while France. Belgium,
and HoUand were willing to give up foreign Jews but resisted when asked for
their native Jews. Arendt was most fascinated by the "sui getluis" character of
the Danes' opposition to the Nazis: "One is tempted to recommend the story
as required reading in political science for all students who wish to learn
something about the enormous power potential inherent in non-violent
action and in resistance to an opponent possessing vastly superior means of
violence."62 The Danes had not only sabotaged Nazi orders and hid Jews
behind the Nazis' backs, but openly denounced the anti-Jewish policies, while
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the whole population, from the King to government officials to dock
workers, refused on principle to cooperate. What is more important, the
German officials and special 5.5. units living in Denmark began to respond to
the Danes' opposition and began sabotaging the orders coming from
Germany. Through the Danes, Arendt gained a lesson to teach political
science students about resistance and political responsibility: "It is the only
case we know of in which the Nazis met with open native resistance, and the
result seems to have been that those exposed to it changed their minds. They
themselves apparently no longer looked upon the extermination of a whole
people as a matter of course. They had met resistance based on principle, and
their 'toughness' had melted like butter in the sun .. the ideal of 'toughness' ...
was nothing but a myth of self-deception, concealing a ruthless desire for
conformity at any price."63
There is little doubt that one of Arendt's major concerns in Eichmann
in Jerusalem is individual political responsibility. She could not have asked
for a better situation-the !:rial of an individual who acted within the context
of a devastatingly dominant political movement--to illustrate this ideal.
Arendt argues that it is precisely because the court weighs individual actions
that a dominant social or political system cannot be used to "explain away"
the actions of the defendant. The defense, fought by Dr. Robert Servatius, had
argued that Eichmarm was a "tiny cog" in the total Nazi system, but for
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Arendt this was no excuse because "all the cogs in the machinery, no matter
how insignificant, are in court forthwith transformed back into perpetrators,
that is to say, into human beings."64 Human beings must accept the
consequences of their actions, for they are responsible and neither History,
Nature, nor the total system of Nazi rule can justify these actions.
Of course it is important to the political and social sciences that the
essence of totalitarian government. and perhaps the nature of every
bureaucracy, is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the
administrative machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them...
Only one must realize clearly that the administration of justice can
consider these factors only to the extent that they are circumstances of
the crime-just as, in a case of theft, the economic plight of the thief is
taken into account without excusing the theft let alone wiping it off
the slate. True, we have become very much accustomed by modem
psychology and sociology. not to speak of modem bureaucracy. to
explaining away the responsibility of the doer for his deed in terms of
this or that kind of detenninism.65
Arendt's greatest fear is that social, political, historical, or psychological
explanations of the situation will swallow up the responsibility of individual
actions. This modem phenomenon consumed both prosecution (by "general
picture drawing" and making allusions to History as the cause of Jewish
persecution: "Is there not perhaps something like ' the spirit of history which
brings history forward .. without the influence of men?' "66) and defense (by
pointing to the unavoidable orders and inevitable movement of the Nazi
regime) and threatened the ability of the court to make a real judgement. A
court can only pass judgement on the deeds of the accused. But this desire of
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Arendt's to point to individual responsibility and to shun analyses of social
and political conditions or "deterministic" explanations. points further to her
belief that people should be political and avoid capitulating to social pressure.
Resistance is always possible and will not be forgotten even in the face of
inevitable defeat, because there will always be people left to remember and
tell the story: "holes of oblivion do not exist."67 "Hence, nothing can ever be
'practically useless: at least not in the long run... Politically speaking, (the
story] is that under conditions of terror most people will comply but 50 me
will not, just as the lesson to the countries to which the Final Solution was
proposed is that 'it could happen' in most places but it did not happen
evaywhere."68
Why, then. did some nations oppose the Final Solution while others
embraced it wholeheartedly? Unfortunately, Arendt's dismay with the
sociological approach in the face of her inspirational concept of individual
natality prevents her from giving any concrete explanations for why some
people resist and others comply. To say that the Danes refused to comply "on
principle." refused because of their "principles." is no answer, especially when
the principle is not defined or its origin explained. Why did the Danes have
this "principle" and not the Rumanians? Arendt does, on the other hand,
offer some form. of explanation: "What in Denmark was the result of an
authentically political sense, an inbred comprehension of the requirements
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and responsibilities of citizenship and independence·-'for the Danes... the
Jewish question was a political and not a humanitarian question' (Lenin
Yahil)-was in Italy the outcome of the almost automatic general humanity of
an old and civilized peopLe." Is this, the closest Arendt gets to an explanation,
her alternative to a sociological, what she calls detenninistic, explanation?
Does "an inbred comprehension of the requirements and responsibilities of
citizenship and independence" or the "general humanity of an old and
civilized people" have any substantial meaning whatsoever? Arendt's
"authentically political sense" is. here rendered. vacuous and, at best, can only
be taken allegorically.
However, the book was, Arendt argued, just a "trial report" and only
meant to convey the evidence and material necessary for the judgement of
Eichmann's actions. Eichmann was guilty and hanged and everyone had
known he was guilty before the trial began because "the facts of the case were
beyond dispute." How otherwise could the Israelis have got away with
kidnapping Eichmann? So the trial could have served only one purpose: "It
[discharged] justice."69 And justice required his hanging because "politics is
not like the nursery; in politics obedience and support are the same and just
as [Eichmann] supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the
earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations-as
though [Eichmann and his) superiors had any right to determine who should
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and should not inhabit the world-we find that no one, that is, no member of
the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with
(Eichmannl_"70 This was no ordinary crime; it was a crime that eclipsed the
previous understanding of a "crime against humanity." For a "crime against
humanity" was understood in terms of violating the "comity of nations" and
this was realized when Germany expelled its Jews into other nations. But the
Nazis' crime was genocide, which is not a crime against "fellow-nations," but
is "an attack. upon human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of
the 'human status' without which the very words 'mankind' or 'humanity'
would be devoid of meaning."71 The Nazis' crime was an attack upon human
plurality.
Long after Arendt had completed her study of Eichmann, one fact
continued to bother her more than any other: what she referred to as
Eichmann's thoughtlessness. She concluded that Eichmann's evil deeds were
not the result of a malicious or vindictive chacacter-"there was no sign in
him of firm ideological convictions or of specific evil motives" 72-but of
"banality." This disturbing and perplexing fact helped provoke Arendt's last
major work The Life of the Mind published posthumOUSly in 1978. She asks,
"Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever
happens to come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results and specific
content, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain
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from evil-doing or even actually 'condition' them against it?"73 Could the
hidden operations of the mind provide the principles and criteria for proper
action in the world? The relation between the vita contemplativa--the three
basic mental activities, thinking, willing, and judging-and the vita activa had
plagued Arendt since the writing of The Human Condition. Problematic was
the term vita activa because it had been developed by philosophers, not
labourers, workers, or actors. [n order to find the links between thought and
action and between thought and evil, Arendt felt it necessary to carry out a
full~fledged inquiry into the mind.
The mind's three fundamental activities--thinking, willing, and
judging-inescapably involve a withdrawal from the phenomenal world.
from what Arendt calls "the world of appearances," and are invisible. Because
of this withdrawal, the mind is a special place free from necessity and the
conditions of existence Arendt outlined in The Human Condition: it is the
one place where humans "transcend all these [existential) conditions, but only
mentally, never in reality."74 Understood from the standpoint of the "world,"
the activities of the mind are "out of order," they are "contrary to the human
condition," because they require stopping to think.75 A person who is, for
example. thinking will appear to those standing nearby to be at rest or at least
to have paused from the regular activities of everyday life. However from the
perspective of the thinker, the mind is continually active.76 This constant
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activity is directed by oneself at ont5tlf in the fonn of internal. dialogic
discussion and debate: "Since plurality is one of the basic existential
conditions of human life on earth... to be by myseU and to have intercourse
with myself is the outstanding characteristic of the life of the mind."'77
Though part of life, the vita conttmplatiuQ is autonomous and lacks the
hierarchical valuation that marks the uita actJ:T1Q. Moreover. "the principles
by which we act and the criteria by which we judge and conduct our lives
depend ultimately on the life of the mind. In short, they depend on the
performance of these apparently profitless mental enterprises that yield no
results and do 'not endow us directly with the power to acr (Heidegger)."78
Each faculty has a relative level of withdrawal: judgement deals with
particular cases and withdraws the least willing is the spring of action but
contends with potential rather than actual deeds, and thinking, withdrawing
the most finds its worldly orientation through language. While thinking is
Hprior'" to willing and judging. it has little value on its own, gaining its
priority by informing the world-oriented faculties of the will and
judgement.79 Thinking is preparatory: it prepares the mind to judge and
initiate actions. So, for example, Eichmann's inability to jlJ.dg~ the enormity
of his deeds was due in great part to his inability to think. Elisabeth Young-
Bruehl, in an essay seeking to construct what Arendt's section on judging
would have looked like-Arendt died on December 4, 1975 shortly after
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completing the section on willing-argues, "One of thinking's 'by-products' or
'side-effects' is judging-but this means that thinking is. in some sense that we
must explore, the necessary condition for judging.H8D What, then, is
thinking? And what is thoughtlessness, the failure to think?
Humans have always thought. Moreover. thinking is a natural activity
that Arendt sees complementing the life process: -rhinking accompanies life
and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of being alive; and since life is a
process. its quintessence can only lie in the actual thinking process and not in
any solid results or specific thoughts."81 Thinking, probing for the meaning of
things. may search for truth but never find it, for questions of meaning are
unanswerable and cannot be satisfied. Arendt saw Socrates as the model
thinker: someone who was equally interested in thinking and acting and who
easily moved between the two realms. Socrates' search for meaning never
issued in a final conclusion but circled continuously, unsatisfied with any
answer. pushing the limits of concepts forever further: "None of the logoi.
the arguments. ever stays put; they move around. And because Socrates,
asking questions to which he does not know the answers, sets them in
motion,. once the statements have come full circle, it is usually Socrates who
cheerfully proposes to start allover again and inquire what justice or piety or
knowledge or happiness are."82 It was perhaps because Socrates did not, like
so many "professional thinkers," conflate thinking with the quest for
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ultimate truth, that he was able to "set in motion" the quest for meaning
which has no end. "Understanding, as distinguished from having correct
information and scientific knowledge, is a complicated process which never
produces unequivocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in constant
change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to
reality, that is, try to be at home in the world."83 Thinking does not find its
purpose in truth or any other end external to its own activity-an activity of
continual questioning-for it is an end in itself.
"The activity of thinking (energeia that has its end in itself] is life." Its
inherent law, which only a god can tolerate forever. man merely now
and then, dUring which time he is godlike, is "unceasing motion,
which is motion in a circle"-the only movement, that is, that never
reaches an end or results in an end product. This very strange notion
that the authentic process of thinking, namely the noesis noeseos,
turns in circles--the most glorious justification in philosophy of the
circular argument--has oddly enough never worried either the
philosophers or Aristotle's interpreters-partiy, perhaps, because of the
frequent mistranslations of nous and theoria as "knowledge," which
always reaches an end and produces an end result. U thinking were a
cognitive enterprise it would have to follow a rectilinear motion,
starting from the quest for its object and ending with cognition of it.84
Thinking, an unremitting, circular quest for the meaning of concepts
like freedom, justice, and equality, makes people morally alert. Thinking
works against potential immoral deeds because people come home to share
and discuss thoughts with themselves in the duality of their minds--what
Arendt calls the "two-in-one." When I go home to the solitude of my mind,
how could I, Arendt asks, bear to live with myself if I were a liar, a cheat, or a
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murderer? How could I want to make myself an adversary of the only person
that I am certain of having to live with-myself? "The partner who comes to
life when you are alert and alone is the only one from whom you can never
get away-except by ceasing to think. It is better to suffer wrong than to do
wrong, because you can remain the friend of the sufferer; who would want to
be the friend of and have to live together with a murderer? Not even another
murderer.nBS It is precisely for these reasons that Arendt argues that, even
though thinking and acting are very different activities, the criteria we use to
act and conduct ourselves in the world rely on the activities of the mind.56 "If
thinking-the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue-actualizes the difference
within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in
conscience as its by-product, then. judging, the by-product of the liberating
effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of
appearances, where I am never alone and always too busy to think. The
manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell
right from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this, at the rare moment when
the stakes are on the table, may indeed prevent catastrophes, at least for the
self."87 Eichmann did not have to worry about opposing his self because he
acted, according to him, with the full support of society who had not opposed
the steps leading to the Final Solution. "Who was he to judge?" Who was he
to think?
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The faculty of thinking is as old as humanity, but the faculty of the will
became particularly evident historically with the rise of Christianity.
Corresponding to "the 'idea' of Freedom," the will provides the impetus for
action, the spontaneous beginning, found implicitly in the absolute novelty
of the birth of Christ and in the novelty of every human's birth. The Greeks
had no concept of the will because they saw the world rotating in terms of a
circular time concept. In other words, for the Greeks all future occurrences
derive from a number of previously given possibilities. While one may have
been able to choose between these possibilities, the possibilities themselves
were not new or novel but rather predetermined and given. Young-Bruehl
argues, "when thinkers emphasize the past within the context of a cyclical
time theory--that is, when the future is seen as an actualization of
consequence of the past-no mental 'organ' for the future, no Will, is posited;
but, on the other hand, when they emphasize the future within a rectilinear
time theory--that is, when unique events are thought to be possible--an
'organ' for the future is considered essential."88 It was Christian thinkers who
saw in the birth of Christ a previously unknown reality that could only be
understood rectilinearly. Augustine was, Arendt believes, the first
philosopher of the will, for he refuted "the philosophers' cyclical time
concepts, inasmuch as novelty could not occur in cycles."89 Instead,
Augustine argued, "In order... that there may be novelty, a beginning must
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exist; 'and this beginning never before existed: that is, not before Man's
creation."90 Men were put on earth as individuals, not as a species; as such
individuals have the power to will: "this individuality manifests itself in the
will"91 which debates, between me and myself, the pros and cons of what I
will versus what I will not.
It is only within the concept of a rectilinear time continuum that the
idea of novelty and beginning things anew can exist and it is only
individuals, seen with a definite beginning and end, that can will or initiate
these new beginnings in time. "The creation of the world and of man was an
absolute beginning as Augustine had imagined it, but each individual's birth
is a beginning in the sense that it interrupts a causal chain and begins a new
series of events."92 What Arendt found in the faculty of the will was the
faculty of beginning, the faculty of foundation, that is so important to her
political theory of action. Actions are, we have seen, spontaneous, contingent
beginnings. For Arendt spontaneity and contingency were not understood
until Christianity broke with the cyclical notion of time. Moreover, the
spontaneity and contingency of actions were not realized until the age of
revolutions. Revolution, an historical event arriving in its fullest and most
complete form in the late eighteenth century with the French and American
Revolutions, realized the mental faculty of the will in action.. in the political
sphere.
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What might the last and unwritten section of The Life of tile Mind, the
section on judgement, have comprised? Young-Bruehl argues that Arendt's
reflections i.n The Life of the Mind are "tied to time concepts," they are
"reflections on homo temporalis,"93 and that Arendt's move from willing to
judging would have involved a change in the understanding of time: "In
order to consider the Will, Arendt had to emphaSize Ilomo temporalis. man
who had a beginning and is going toward an end, and to do this she had to
turn away from cyclical time theories. A different sort of time speculation
stands in the way of her consideration of Judgment: a [unilinearJ time theory
in which the future, so to speak, calls events toward itself. In such a future
events are judged by history as the determinants of the process."94 In other
words, Arendt's faculty of judgement counters the unilinear movement of
process characteristic of the modem age's belief in progress and characteristic
of Hegel's process of "becoming."95 The faculty of judgement is meant to
prevent us from blindly following the laws of Nature and History that
defined the twentieth century's totalitarian movements. Where thinking
enacts a silent duality beh-veen me and myself and willing enacts the duality
of the I will and the I nill, "Judging's recoil is different it is the activation of a
'me and you (plural).' When we judge we imaginatively make others present
in ourselves... [wei make, so to speak, an interior public space 'by comparing
our judgment with the possible rather than the judgment of others, and by
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putting ourselves in the place of any other man: "96
When we put ourselves in the place of others, we are gaining a
perspective of impartiality or disinterestedness: "This disinterestedness .. of
judging is its freedom; it is the activation of the 'me and you: the overcoming
of self-interest."97 While judging relies on thinking, only judging has
political effects in the world. By denying our self-interest and relating
personally to the interests of others, we put our interest in society, our
interest in humanity as a whole. This interest in humanity as a whole,
Young-Bruehl attributes to Arendt's belief in humanitas. Arendt "tried to
show that judging and acting have the same principle, which is not
transcendental, but empirical: We must act and judge in ways that do not
violate the actually existing solidarity of mankind. 'A secret trust in man, in
the humanitas of the human race' animates action and judgement. Trust in
humanitas is another way of saying trust in the love men have for meaning,
the love they have for the existence of things and people, and the
communicative pleasure they take in reflecting on those things and
people."98 In short, the faculty of judgement provides the solidarity necessary
to prevent extreme self-interest and promote care for the human race.
Thinking provides the groundwork for good judgements by prOViding the
faculty of judgement with ideas of good and evil, right and wrong, when they
are needed in the world. Eichmann was unable to relate to the other, unable
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to relate to the situation of the Jews, and thus unable to judge the evil of his
deeds. His inability to think. his inability to let the freedom of his mind run
with questions of right and wrong, was due in great part because he allowed
himself to identify his will with the Fuhrer's will. The freedom of
disinterestedness prevents the unilinear compulsion and necessity of History,
Nature, or Progress, and could have prevented Eichmann's automatic,
unthinking obedience to reified "ideals" and to Hitler.
Movement is evident, then. in Arendt's philosophical, as well as her
political, theory as a principle and fonnative element. Thinking is an activity
concurrent with the appearance of humans on earth. The faculty of the will
did not become evident until Christians began thinking about the significance
of the birth of Christ and thus understanding the movement of time
rectilinearly. And the faculty of judgement did not become fully significant
until Immanuel Kant wrote the Critiqu.e of Judgement around the time of the
French Revolution,. when the social and political world, finally understood
rectilinearly, became open to change and manipulation.
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CONCLUSION
The Invasion of the Public by the Social
In broad terms, Hannah Arendt, a theorist whose reputation is
currently undergoing revitalization, bears some resemblance to those classical
social theorists who took modernity-what Arendt prefers to call the modem
age-as their object of study. While Arendt shares with them an interest in
human action, this is because she shares with Marx a common concern to
change the modem world and not merely to interpret it. Unlike Marx.
however, Arendt wanted to safeguard the separation of the private and public
spheres, to prevent the Hsocial" from interfering with and contaminating the
"political." Arendt is concerned about the modem age because the
pervasiveness of social issues-of social inequality, social domination. social
injustice, patriarchy, and so on-has perverted and suffocated authentic
political action. In contrast. her ideal public men pursue political affairs out of
a genuine desire for free and open debate, to share and confirm a common
reality, for honour, glory, heroism. The rise of the social and the fall of public
man are one and the same development. Politics today has become an
expression of social situations, class positions, and economic stakes. As such.
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it cannot be free because it becomes tied to necessity. to the concerns of
maintaining life, not to the concerns of maintaining a free body politic.
"Social" issues are "natural" issues: they pay their dues to the life process.
"Political" issues are "artificial" issues, concerned with the freedom and
equality that nature cannot spontaneously provide.
[0 Arendt's effort to show in general theoretical terms why this
segregation of the social and political is valid, she argues that these realms
contain fundamental activities whose defining character corresponds to
different kinds of movement. Chapter 1 revealed that Arendt characterized
labour, the activity of animals laborans. as the movement of nature, as
repetitive, circular motion. And work, the activity of homo faber, with its
emphasis on utility and the attempt in the modem age to "make" History,
Arendt viewed as unilinear movement. In contrast, action (activity in the
public sphere) contained neither the cycle of nature nor the motion forward
to some historically determined point. Arendt linked action, arising neither
from necessity nor determined by social or historical forces, to "natality," the
initiation and spontaneous beginning of a movement. As such, action is no
definite movement; it is the timeless beginning of, indeed condition of, a
movement unencumbered by social and historical conditions. In contrast to
the unilinear nature of processes that work towards a predetermined end,
actions can only be understood within a rectilinear time construct. The
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difference is a subtle but vital one for Arendt's philosophical position. While
both unilinear and rectilinear mean movement in straight lines, Arendt
argues that only rectilinear movement provides for the possibilities of new
beginnings. Rectilinear movement, then, is not a single, thus uni, linear
movement, but contains many straight linear movements that are
understood to be free and novel precisely because their condition is action
and thus the human possibility of making new beginnings.
Arendt's singular achievement was not only that she developed a
taxonomy of activities as movements, but also that she outlined a theory of
the perception of time, which itself constituted a theory of the western
world's interpretation of change as the historical shift from a cyclical time
concept to a rectilinear time concept. Arendt outlined her theory of the
human construction of time by focusing upon particular. historical events;
events. she argued. which "broke the cycle" of "the indifferent flow of
everlasting change."
Significant for Arendt are two entirely unprecedented events that
recast the perception of time and change: the birth of Jesus Christ and the
development of the modem revolution characterized particularly by the
American and French Revolutions. Distinguishing these events and
providing the necessary uniqueness to break the banal circulari ty of the
mundane world are their thoroughly novel character. Novelty, Arendt
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argued. cannot be understood in terms of a cyclical time concept but rather
requires a conception of temporal change that is expressly rectilinear. This
emphasis upon newness and individuality is precisely what links Arendt's
taxonomy of human activities with her theory of the perception of time and
change. Arendt's praise of novelty, expressed most saliently in her concept of
natality, graces both her description of political action and those historical
events that rupture the endless similarity of cyclical change. Equally, human
labour, the cyclical, continual toil necessary for the perpetuation of the life
process, corresponds to those early explanations of time and change modelled
upon the movement of the heavens.
To a significant extent it was Saint Augustine who supplied Arendt
with an outlook for reading the world in terms of movement, an outlook
that valued. beginnings for rupturing the determined regularity of a naturally
and automatically changing world. Chapter 2--focusing on Arendt's PhD
thesis, Love and Saint Augustine-traced the origin of Arendt's concern with
beginnings and natality and examined the significance of Christianity for her
theory of the human perception of time. Human beings, according to
Arendt's reading of Augustine, introduce an entirely new configuration into
the otherwise meaningless movement of nature. Because humans can plan
for and project themselves into the future, they are able to insert a rectilinear
movement into the world altogether different from the purposeless
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movement of nature. Since humans are "conscious of, and remember [their]
'beginning' or [their} origin.. (humans arel able to act as [beginners] and enact
the story of mankind.")
Yet the origin so important to Augustine-the act of creation enabling
individuals to begin their lives anew by way of salvation-was made manifest
to humanity only through the birth of Jesus Christ. As such, the birth of
Christ represented a wholly novel and unprecedented historical event that
was strikingly different from the insignificant births of previous generations.
According to Arendt, the pre·Christian perception of time as cyclical change
underwent radical reconceptualization as a result of this transmundane
event: the birth of Christ led to an understanding of rectilinear time that
broke the cosmological circle. lndividuals were suddenly presented with the
possibility of entirely new beginnings, with birth rather than rebirth.
initiation as opposed to renewal. However, these beginnings were considered
primarily to be the capacities of private individuals who had rejected the
public world in order to immerse themselves in a deeply personal, hidden
relationship with God. Consequently, the social and political world remained
turning regularly in circles of predestined change. It was not until the advent
of the modem revolution, argued Arendt, that the historical development of
the secular world ceased to be understood cyclically.
With modernity came liberation from a conception of history that
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endlessly replicated old social and political orders and that was considered
never to produce anything new. But the unleashing of free and spontaneous
human action also meant the unleashing of the potential for negative as well
as positive political orders, for negative as well as positive linear movement.
Political action. Arendt pointed out, is an individual obligation and an
individual responsibility necessary for the development of constructive as
opposed to destructive political action. Yet the modern age produced
totalitarian regimes, which Arendt saw embodying the radical nature of
absolute evil. Through an examination of Arendt's first major political work.
The Origins of Totalitarianism, I sought to show in Chapter 3 how
conceptions of movement inform Arendt's examination of Nazi and Stalinist
totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism, Arendt claimed, is an altogether different fonn of
political organization in as much as it fails to respect. indeed sets itself
radically against. the conventional political distinction between stability and
change. Instead of upholding laws that both stabilize and protect the transient
character of human action, totalitarian movements destroy the
unpredictability of action and replace it by the monolithic behaviour of an
homogenized mass. As opposed to "positive laws" that provide limits on and
conditions for free action, totalitarian regimes inculcate ideologies and inflict
terror necessary for the development of "laws" of Nature or History. The logic
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of these laws. the logic of totalitarianism, is of an unavoidable process-the
idea of a naturally evolving "progression" with a predetermined direction. As
such, Arendt argued that the content and import of these laws lie in their
movement. Indeed she went so far as to claim that totalitarianism does not
just enact an ideal of movement, but, based upon laws of Nature or History,
becomes movement in itself "where the essence of government itself has
become motion."2
However the movement of totalitarianism is not just any movement,
it is the third of the three fonns of process movement identified in chapter 1.3
As opposed to the conservative character of nature and the life process, the
unilinear process of totalitarian regimes sacrifices the individual goal of self-
preservation for a self-sacrificing and irrepressible linear movement of
"progression." On the other hand, it is quite clear that Arendt is not opposed
to linear movement as such, but rather is only hostile towards its unt1inear
species. We have seen that Arendt's political project was in some key respects
animated by a desire to overcome the cyclical monotony of a life devoted to
"social" concerns, a desire she expressed in her preference for the "public"
sphere. That sphere was, par excellence, the locus of "action." Action, while in
essence no particular type of movement itself, cannot be comprehended
except in terms of a rectilinear time construct: "It is obvious that only under
the conditions of a rectilinear time concept are such phenomena as novelty,
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uniqueness of events, and the like conceivable at all."4 What is it then. that
made unilinear movement so problematic for Arendt?
According to Arendt, unilinear movement is a uni~directional,
unswerving arrow-it drives blindly forward in an undeviating straight line
from the present to an ostensibly foreordained future. But at the same time,
unilinear movement preserves the properties or attributes of cyclical
movement: necessity, inevitability, regularity, futility. In other words, a
movement is unilinear when cyclical movement superimposes itself upon
and alters the rectilinear mode that action assumes. The reason why this is
problematic for Arendt becomes evident once we understand her tendency to
identify particular activities (and in tum the realms they inhabit) with
particular types of movement. Consequently, when cyclical movement
superimposes itself upon the contingent and indeterminate character of
rectilinear movement, Arendt sees the necessary and irresistible character of
the labour process contaminating the public realm of politics.
Arendt's taxonomy of activities as movements, then, reveals not a
neutral classification but a value-loaded appraisal that sets the artificial
freedom of political action against the natural necessity of labour, the freedom
of an undefined and contingent beginning against the irresistible and
predetermined movement of the cycle. As a result. unilinear movement is
not just the conflation of two types of movement that are meant to remain
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separate and distinct. but it is the displacement of the valued rectilinear
movement of political action by the devalued movement of the cycle.
Chapter 4 examined Arendt's On Revolution. In that work she maps
the development of unilinear movement--what she calls "the rise of the
social" and what she sees as one of the defining features of the modem age-
in historical terms as a product of the modem revolution and in particular of
the French revolution.
Arendt argued that the American and French revolutions were
radically unprecedented political events that signified the same absolute
novelty as the birth of Christ. But whereas the birth of Christ had onIy broken
the cosmological circularity of the perception of time and change for
individuals and their secluded relationships with God, revolution broke the
regular and predestined cycle of the secular world making it amenable to
human alteration and control. But the newly exposed possibilities of human
action did not often translate into the constitution of a body politic that
fiercely protected a public realm defined by political action. rnstead, many
revolutions unleashed private, economic interests and struggles whose
management and adjudication were then considered to be the very raison
d'etre of political action. Arendt's key example of such a revolution was the
French revolution of 1789 which saw the poverty-stricken masses stream into
the public streets of Paris dragging with them their private personal needs.
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She saw this development as the invasion of the public realm by the urgency
and necessity of the biological life process, as the superimposition of cyclical
movement on rectilinear movement, as the momentary triumph of the
"irresistible" and historically necessary. Consequently, it was the French
revolution that represented for Arendt the first major occasion in which
unilinear movement found political expression, and thereby affirmed the
primacy of the social over the political. Moreover, the Jacobin "Terror"
destroyed political freedom not only in its increasingly arbitrary destructions
of victims, but in its sanctioning a view of history and nature as an inexorable
process that rages on with or without human cooperation. Against this,
Arendt valued a notion of politics as decidedly un-natural, the product of an
artificial realm that preserves freedom and law, political action and restraint.
Arendt saw the ambivalence of the modem age in revolution's capacity
for responsible as well as irresponsible political action, its capacity for the
undefined contingency of rectilinear change as well as for the necessity of
unilinear development. Revolution's import for Arendt's political project,
then, springs from the political potential of beginnings that "break the cycle"
of undifferentiated history in favour of significant and purposeful change. It
was precisely the American revolutionaries', the "Founding Fathers',"
integration of the act of foundation into their constitution that made the
American revolution successful. In a sense, then, the movement of
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beginning is a non-movement standing outside the instability of moving
time. But the timeless act of foundation can neither be understood nor can it
attain political significance except in terms of a rectilinear time concept.
through which the beginning nourishes and protects a body politic by
providing it with a past with which to negotiate its future. As such, the 000-
movement of the foundational act provides the ground for maintaining the
free rectilinear duration of a body politic.
Chapter 5 tied together Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on
the Banality of Evil and her last unfinished work The Life of the Mind. In her
report on the Eichmann trial. Arendt concluded that what lay behind the
monstrosity of Eichmann's deeds was the inability to think which prevented
the proper judgement of action. Prompted by this discovery, Arendt's later
work switched from an emphasis on the phenomenal world of politics to an
introspective philosophical analysis of the mind; she put aside her concern
with the vita activa to consider the three basic activities of the mind--
thinking, willing, and judging--that form the vita contemplativa.
Interestingly, the defining character of Arendt's reading of mental as well as
worldly activities corresponds to different kinds of movement.
Of all three activities of the mind, thinking is the least oriented to the
world, since it amounts to a private dialogue with oneself. As such.. thinking
is comparable to labour in its privacy and inborn naturalness. But most
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important, thinking shares labour's movement, for it is a constant activity of
dialogue that never arrives at any end but continues indefinitely and
interminably. Thinking and labour attain significance as the means necessary
for judging and acting. It was only because the novelty of Christ's birth "broke
the cycle" in favour of a rectilinear time concept that the will, a future-
oriented faculty, became prominent as a subject of philosophical speculation.
While the will provides the impetus for action, it is clear that Arendt views
its form of movement similarly to that of work: the will. as future-oriented,
posits a particular object or outcome towards which the individual is called.
Therefore both the will and work have the tendency of moving unHinearly
towards an imposed, definite end.
While Arendt died before writing the section on judgement, we saw
that there was good reason to argue that the faculty of judgement, the most
worldly or publicly-oriented faculty of the mind, would have posed itself, as
does political action, against the movement of a unilinear conception of
change. By putting ourselves in the place of others, judgement overcomes the
self-interestedness of willing and therefore overcomes the God-like quality of
the will as "making" or "creating" its own future. Consequently, the
indeterminate and contingent character of judgement closely resembles the
rectilinear movement of political action which never determines its end
because of the nature of public interaction. And while judgement, like
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thinking and willing, corresponds well with Arendt's taxonomy of activities
as movements, judgement also arises historically, relating fundamentally to
Arendt's theory of change: judgement was not systematically conceptualized
until Kant wrote the Critique of ludgement shortly after the French
Revolution. In sum, just as thinking, willing, and judging correspond to
labour, work, and action, so do each of these elements also correspond to
Arendt's prescriptive taxonomy of movement-activities_
Arendt's appraisal of modernity is inseparable from her method of
analysis: a method which relies upon explicitly identifying the metaphors
vital to the modem age, metaphors which continually refer to movement.
Arendt does not, however, impartially record these metaphors, but
embellishes and expands upon them, clearly developing her own theoretical
constructs, analyses, and judgements. Movement, then, is evident in Arendt's
social and political theory as a principal and formative element. That theory
directly opposes the necessity of nature and the "life process" and articulates
an alternative, action, which she argues i.s free and open, prOViding the
necessary space for human--as distinct from animal--movement. Human
movement thus conceived is thus not just any movement for Arendt;
crucially, it is not a unilinear process directed towards a pre-given,
determined end. Instead, action is a human ideal set against our natural,
biological existence, an ever-renewed, ever-changing rectilinear motion as
fragile and unpredictable as the world in which it is located..
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Introduction: Arendt and Sociology, Sociology and Arendt
\. There has been much literature devoted to the "Atlantic Republican Tradition" of
which J.G.A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political TIlought and tile
Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton: 1975. is exemplary. Specifically in connection
with the work of Arendt. one might look at Peter Fuss, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of
Political Community," in Idealistic Shldies, 1973, 3: 252-65.
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Chapter 1. Movement and the Vita Activa
1. Note, however. Margaret Canavan's contrary argument in Hannah Arendt: A
ReillleTPretatioll 01 Her Political Thol/glrt (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 1992).
where she argues that the themes developed in Arendt's The Origins a/Totalitarianism are
at the centre of her political thinking.
2 Margaret Canavan. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, %-97.
3. Hannah Arendt The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1958),99.
4. "Ideology and Terror" appended to the second edition of Hannah Arendt The Origins
of Totalitarianism (London: Allen and Unwin.. 1958). It was first published in the
publication Reviw ofPolih"CS in July 1953.
5. Hannah Arendt. The Origl"ns ofTotaJitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company,
19731, 463.
6. Arendt. The Hllman Condition. 47. See also page 191: "The fences inclosing private
property and insuring the limitations ofeach household, the territorial boundaries which
protect and make possible the physical identity of a people, and the laws which protect
and make possible its political existence. are of such great importance to the stabili~ of
~~~~e~~::a:theb:e~':nseofh~~~~gi:~.p'rotectingprinciples rise out 0 the
7. Arendt The HII.man Condition, 96.
8. Arendt. The Hflrtuln Condition, 7.
9. Arendt The Human Condition, 11.
10. Arendt The Human Condition, 9-11.
II. Arendt. The Human Condition. p. 7. See also Arendt's The Life of the Mind. one-
volume edition. Thinking. vol. 1, Willing. vol. 2 (San Diego:Harcourt Brace k Company,
~8~:~iia~l~inw£:;l~~ ili:~hi~t~~~~~~:~ss~~~I;tr=~~~ci~:
of himself. which we probably share with the higher animals. into a duality during the
~~~i~eh:%'II~~th ~~a~~~~~=f~~:!~:~~::~::."thinkinga true
12. Arendt The Human Condition, p. 33.
13. Hannah Arendt "What is Freedom?" in Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in
Political Thought (New York: The Viking Press, 1968), 149.
14. Arendt. The Human Condition, 46.
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15. Harmah Arendt. On Rl:flOllltion (New York.: The Viking Press, 1965), 78.
16. Arendt. Till! HI/man Condition, 97-98.
17. Hannah Arendt. "The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern" in Between Past and
~;g~;~::fj~:~e;:~ ::~i~i~:lf[~°th~~tJ~~~uY~rtfre::p!~~~fit ~r~:'~~~b[~~~
story from birth to death. rises out of biological life. (wTf. This individual life is
distinguished from all other things by the rectilinear course of its movement., which,. so to
~~a~~~:~hl~: ~r~~~~~:::ehe~eo~:~~~~~I:i~·tr::v~s~~~i%~~e~:~
~~~:~_~r~:;'~~~Vi~tomfu~fr~~::~~~~~S::e~fin~e:~~~ili~;~a:~:~
movement which is purposeless and turning within itself... What is difficult for US to
realize is that the great deeds and works of which mortals are capable. and which
become the topic of historical narrative, are not seen as parts of either an encompassing
whole or a process; on the contrary. the stress is always on single instances and single
gestures. These single instances, deeds or events, interrupt the circular movement of
daily life in the same sense that the rectilinear fjlOl;of the mortals interrupts the circular
movement of biological life. The subject matter of history is these interruptions-the
extraordinary, in other WOrds."
t8. Arendt:, The Hilman Condition, 97.
19. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments (New York: The Continuum Publishing Company, 1993-0riginally published
in English by Herder and Herder. Inc. in 1972) 134.
20. Arendt:, The Human Condition, 88.
21. Arendt, Ti,e Human Condition, 246.
22 Arendt, Tile Human Condition, 87.
23. Arendt, The Human Condition, 116.
24. Arendt:, The Human Condition, 46-47.
25. Arendt, The Human Condition, 115.
26. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution. 19·20. "The notion of a state of nature alludes at
least to a reality that cannot be comprehended by the nineteenth·century idea of
development [note: this is the unilinear conception Arendt links with Marx and Darwin
in The Origins ofTotalitarianism, 463L no matter how we may conceive of it - whether in
the form of cause and effect, or of potentiality and actuality, or of a dialectical
movement, or even of simple coherence and sequence in occurrences. For the hypothesis of
a state of nature implies the existenu of a beginning that is separated from everything
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following it as though by an unbridgeable chasm." (Emphasis added)
?7. Hannah Arendt,. On Revolution, 27. "We have stressed the element of novelty inherent
in all revolutions, and it is maintained frequently that our whole notion of history,
because its course follows a rectilinear development is Christian in origin. It is obvious
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true, broke with the time concept of antiquity because the birth of Christ occurring in
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event"
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Chapter 2. Novelty and the Birth of Christ
1. Gustav Mahler adapted this from the 8th-century Chinese poet Li Tai Po.
20 Hannah Arendt. On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1%5),55.
3. Hannah Arendt. TIle Hllman Condition, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
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Chapter 3. TotaIitariauism and the Movement of Process
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